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drawn  up  on  behalf  of  the Political Affairs  Committee 
on  the  Horn  of  Africa 
Rapporteur:  Mr  C.  RIPA  di  MEANA 
PE  87.298/fin. 
Or.  It. By  Letter  of  9  December  1982  the Political  Affairs  Committee  re~~=--~~ 
authorization  to  draw  up  a  report  on  the  Horn  of  Africa. 
On  7  February  1983  in  a  ~~tting ot  the  whole  House  the  committee  was 
authorized  to  report  on  this subject. 
The  European  Parliament  referred  tne  following  motions  for  resolutions, 
tabled  pursuant  to  Rule  47  of  the  Rules  of  Procedure,  to  the Political Affairs 
Committee  as  the  committee  responsible  : 
-on 13.1 .1983,  the  motion  for  a  resolution  tabled  by  Mr  PEDINI  and  others 
on  the  situation  in  the  region  of  Eritrea  <Doc.  1-1129/82) 
-on 11.4.1983,  the  motion  for  a  resolution  tabled by  Mr  HAHN  and  others 
on  the  forcible  repatriation of  Ethiopian  refugees  in  Djibouti  (Doc.  1-23/83) 
-on 11.4.1983,  the  motion  for  a  resolution  tabled  by  Mr  ALMIRANTE  and  others 
on  the situation  in  Eritrea  (Doc.  1-45/83) 
The  Committee  on  Development  and  Cooperation  was  asked  for  an  opinion 
on  the  abovementioned  motions  for  a  resolution. 
On  16  March  1983  the  Political Affairs  Committee  appointed 
Mr  RIPA  Dl  MEANA  rapporteur. 
The  Political  Affairs  Committee  considered  the  report  at  its meetings 
of  23-24  November  1983  and  28  February  - 1  March  1984.  At  the  latter meeting 
it unanimously  adopted  the  motion  for  a  resolution. 
The  foLLowing  took  part  in  the  vote:  Mr  HAAGERUP,vice-chairman; 
and  acting  chairman;  Mr  CHARZAT,  second  vice-chairman;  Mr  FERGUSSON,  third 
vice-chairman;  Mr  RIPA  Dl  MEANA,  rapporteur;  Lord  BETHELL,  Mr  CARIGLIA, 
Lady  ELLES,  Mr  FELLERMAIER  (deputizing  for  Mr  B.  FRIEDRICH),  Mr  GEROKOSTOPOULOS 
(deputizing  for  Mr  BDURNIAS),  Mr  HABSBURG,  Mr  von  HASSEL,  Mrs  van  den  HEUVEL, 
Mr  ISRAEL  (deputizing  for  Mr  de  La  MALENE),  Mr  KLEPSCH,  Mr  MOMMERSTEEG 
(deputizing  for  Mr  DESCHAMPS),  Mr  NORMANTON  (deputizing  for  Mr  NEWTON  DUNN), 
Mr  d'ORMESSON,  Mr  PENDERS,  Sir J.  SCOTT-HOPKINS,  Mrs  SCRIVENER  {deputizing  fo 
Mr  DONNEZ),  Mr  SEITLINGER  (deputizing  for  Mr  BARBI),  Mr  VAN  MIERT,  Mr  WALTER 
and  Mr  ZAGARI. 
2  .. - 3  - PE  87 .298/fin. The  opinion of  the  Committee  on  Development  and  Cooperation  is  attached. 
The  report  was  tabled  on  6  March  1984. 
The  deadline  for  tabling  amendments  to this  report  will  be  indicated  1n 
1e  draft  agenda  for  the  part-session at  which  it will  be  debated. 
- 3a  - PE  87.298/fin. 
Or  Tt. _C __  0  __  N  __  T  __  E  __  N  __  T  __  S_ 
A.  MOTION  FOR  A RESOLUTION 
B.  EXPLANATORY  STATEMENT  ...•......•....•.......••.........•..•• 
INTRODUCTION  .•..............•...•..•..•..•....•.• 
I  - ETHIOPIA 
a- From  empire  to  revolution  .•••.•••......•..•..•••••.• 
b- The  new  revolutionary  government  •.......••.•......•• 






d- Current  internal  situation  and  the  Soviet  presence  ..  17 
e- The  problem  of  Eritrea ....••••.••..•.••••.....•.•.•.  21 
f- The  problem  of  Tigre  ••••.••...••••.•.•••••••..••••..  24 
g- The  problem  of  Ogaden  .••••...••.•..••.•.••••.•••.•.•  25 
I I  - SOMAL I A . • . . . . . • . . . . . . • • . • . . . . . . . . . • . • • • • • • . • • • • • . . • . . • . .  2  7 
a  - Internal  situation  and  conflicts  with  neighbouring 
states  . . . . . • . . . . . . • • • • . • . . . . . . • . . • . • . . • • • . . • . . . • . . . •  27 
b  - From  a  Soviet  Union  presence  to  a  United  States 
presence  . . • . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . • • . . • . . . . . . . . . . . • • • • .  28 
III  - DJIBOUTI.................................................  31 
IV  - THE  SUDAN  . . . . . • . . • . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • • . • . . . . • . . • • • • . • .  34 
a  - Economic  situation  . . . . . • . • • • . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . • • • .  34 
b- Ethnic  and  political  problems  •..•.••..•.••.•.•.......  35 
c  - Foreign  policy  ••..........••.•........•.....•..•.....  36 
V-KENYA  •.....•..•...........••............••.••.•...••.•..•  38 
a  - Economic  situation ... .. .. .• •• ..... ..........  ..••••.••  38 
b- Political situation...................................  39 
c  - Foreign  policy  . . . . . . . • . . . • • . . . • • . . • • . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . .  40 
VI- HUMAN  RIGHTS  IN  THE  COUNTRIES  OF  THE  HORN  OF  AFRICA  ..•••.  41 
VII  - THE  PROBLEM  OF  REFUGEES  IN  THE  HORN  OF  AFRICA  AND  IN 
THE  SUDAN  ...............•.•........  , • • • • . . . • . . . • • . • . . . . .  42 
VIII  - THE  POSITION  OF  THE  EUROPEAN  PARLIAMENT  AND  A COMMUNITY 
STRATEGY.................................................  44 
CONCLUSIONS  . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . • . . • • . . . . • . • • . . . . . . • . . • . . . . . . . . •  47 
- 4  - PE  87.298/tin. Opinion  of  the  Committee  on  Development  and  Cooperation ...............•.....  49 
ANNEX  I  Motion  for  a  resolution tabled  by  Mr  PEOINI  and  others on  the 
situation  in  the  region  of  Eritrea  (Doc.  1-1129/82)  .....••........  58 
ANNEX  II:  Motion  for  a  resolution tabled  by  Mr  HAHN,  Mrs  LENZ  and  Mr  von 
HASSEL  on  the  forceible  repatriation of  Ethiopian  refugees  in 
Djibouti,  (Doc.  1-23/83)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  59 
ANNEX  III:  Motion  for  a  resolution  tabled by  Mr  ALMIRANTE  and  others  on 
the  situation  in  Eritrea  (Doc.  1-45/83)  •.........................  60 
- 4a  - PE  87.298/fin. A 
The  Political  Affairs  Committee  hereby  submits  the  following  motion  for  a 
resolution  to  the  European  Parliament,  together  with  explanatory  statement: 
on  the  Hor·n  of  Africa 
- having  regard  to  its  resolution  of  10  May  1979  on  respect  for  human  rights 
in  Ethiopia1, 
having  regard  to  its resolution  of  14  December  1979  on  the  tragic  plight 
of  refugees,  particularly  children,  in  the  Horn  of  Africa2, 
- having  regard  to  its  resolution  of  23  May  1980  on  the  wretched  situation 
of  the  refugees  in  Somalia3, 
- having  regard  to  its resolution  of  11  July  1980  on  the  dramatic  situation 
of  the  refugees,  especially  the  children  amongst  them,  in  the  Horn  of 
Africa4, 
having  regard  to  its  resolution  of  18  November  1982  on  the  situation  in 
Somalia5, 
having  regard  to  its  resolution  of  14  April  1983  on  emergency  aid  for 
E  h
.  .  6 
t  1 op 1 a  , 
- having  regard  to  the  motion  for  a  resolution tabled  by  Mr  PEDINI  and 
others  on  behalf  of  the  EPP  Group  on  the  situation  in  the  region  of 
Eritrea  (Doc.  1-1129/82), 
- having  regard  to  the  motion  for  a  resolution  tabled  by  Mr  HAHN  and  others 
on  the  forcible  repatriation of  Ethiopian  refugees  in  Djibouti  (Doc.  1-23/83), 
----------------
1  OJ  No.  c 140,  5.6.1979,  p.  82 
20J  No.  c 4,  7.1 .1980,  p.  75 
30J  No.  c 147,  16.6 .1980,  p.  120 
40J  No.  c 197,  4.8.1980,  p.  81 
SOJ  No.  c 334,  20. 1  2. 1982,  p.  84 
60J  No.  c 128,  16. 5.1983,  p.  63 
- 5  - PE  87.298/·rev. - having  regard  to  the  resolution  tabled  by  Mr  ALMIRANTE  and  others  on  the 
situation  in  Eritrea  (Doc.  1-45/83), 
- having  regard  to the  report  of  the Political  Affairs  Committee 
and  the  opinion  of  the  Committee  on  Development  and  Cooperation  (Doc.  1-1532/83), 
A- bearing  in  mind  the  fact  that  Djibouti,  Ethiopia  and  Somalia  are  sig-
natories  to  the  Lorn~ Convention, 
B - noting  the political  and  economic  links  between  some  Member  States 
and  these  countries, 
C - noting  the  strategic  importance  of  the  Horn  of  Africa  for  both 
Western  countries  and  the  Eastern Bloc,  being  adjacent  to  the  Arabian 
peninsula, 
D- concerned  about  the  20-year-old  conflict  between  the  Ethiopian  State  and 
the  Eritrean  resistance,  in  which  Ethiopia  is  being  supported  by  many 
thousands  of  troops  and  military advisers  from  the  Soviet  Union,  the 
German  Democratic  Republic,  Cuba  and  South  Yemen, 
E - recalling the  resolution  adopted  by  the  Assembly  of  the  United  Nations 
on  2  December  1950  which  stated that  Eritrea  should  constitute an 
autonomous  unit  federated  with  Ethiopia  and  having  wide  powers  over  its 
own  internal  affairs, 
F - concerned  also  about  the  Tigrai  conflict  and  the  guerilla  war  in  the 
Ogaden, 
G - concerned  about  the  danger  of  a  fragmentation  of  the  Ethiopian  State 
which  might  render  the  region  of  the  Horn  of  Africa  and  surrounding 
areas  even  more  unstable, 
H- alarmed  by  the  growing  large-scale militarization of  the  region  of  the 
Horn  of  Africa, aggravated  by  Ethiopian  policies  and  military action, 
I  - concerned  about  the tripartite agreement  between  Ethiopia,  Libya  and 
South  Yemen  which  is foisting  outside  tensions  into  the  region  of  the 
Horn  of  Africa, 
- 6  - PE  87.298/rev. L- recalling  the  resolution  of  the  Foreign  Ministers  at  the  Islamic 
Conference  in  Islamabad  in  1980,  which  called  for  the  withdrawal  of 
Soviet  and  allied troops  from  the  region  and  also  the  removal  of  foreign 
bases  in  the  Horn  of  Africa  and  the  Red  Sea  and  the exclusion  of  this 
area  from  superpower  confrortJtion, 
M - disturbed  at  the  tension  which  exists  between  Ethiopia  and  her_ 
neighbours, 
'N- keenly  concerned  about  the  drought  and  famine  afflicting the  peoples  of 
Ethiopia,  Somalia  and  Djibouti, 
0- greatly  alarmed  by  the plight  of  refugees  in  the  Horn  of  Africa  and 
neighbouring  countries  such  as  the  Sudan, 
P- considering  that  the  tripartite agreement  between  Ethiopia,  Djibouti 
and  the  United  Nations  High  Commissioner  on  the  repatriation of 
Ethiopian  refugees  in  Djibouti  should  not  Lead  to  forcible  repatriation, 
Q  - disturbed  by  the  consequences  of  the  creation  of  semi-permanent 
refugee  camps  in  the  Ogaden, 
R - concerned  about  the  human  rights  situation  in  the  region, particularly  in 
Ethiopia, 
1.  Strongly  condemns  the  multiple  interventions  of  the  Soviet  Union  and  the 
countries  of  the  Eastern  Bloc  in  the  Horn  of  Africa  and  the  stationing 
and  use  in  action  of  troops  from  the  Soviet  Union,  Cuba,  the  German 
Democratic  Republic  and  South  Yemen, 
2.  Invites  all  the  great  powers  not  to make  this  region  a  place  of  confronta-
tion  and  rearmament, 
3.  ~ks the  Foreign  Ministers  meeting  in political  cooperation  and the Council 
of  Ministers  as  such 
(a)  to  adopt  a  common  standpoint  on  the  problems  of  the  Horn  of  Africa  in order 
to  take  all  such  initiatives as  may  contribute  to  a  solution of  the 
conflicts  and  the  re-establishment  of  friendly  relations  between  the 
states  and  ethnic  groups  of  the  region, 
- 7  - PE  87.298/·fin. Cb)  to bring pressure  to  bear  on  the  Soviet  Union  to  withdraw  its troops  and 
those of  countries  allied to  it  from  Ethiopia  and  to  work  together  with 
the  international  community  to aid  the  refugees  and  the  people  threatened 
by  famine, 
(c)  to  strongly  urge  the  Ethiopian  Government  to  find  a  peaceful  and  nego-
tiated solution of  the  conflict  between  it  and  the  Eritrean peoples 
which  takes  account  of  their  identity,  as  recognized  by  t~e United  Nations 
resolution of  2  December  1950,  and  is  consistent  with  the  basic  principles 
of  the  OAU, 
(d)  to  invite  the  Governments  of  Ethiopia,  Somalia  and  Kenya  to  find  peaceful 
solutions  to  their territorial and  ethnic differences  in  such  a  way  as  to 
take  account  of  the  legitimate  interests of  the  populations, 
(e)  to bring all  possible  pressure  to bear  on  the  governments  of  the  states 
of  the  region  to  respect  human  rights, 
(f)  to ask,  in particular,  the  Government  of  Ethiopia  to  release  or  bring to 
trial the  former  Royal  family  of  Ethiopia,  bearing  in  mind  that  the  peoples 
of  Europe,  who  attach  great  importance  to  respect  for  human  rights,  are 
.providing  substantial  amounts  of  aid  to  promote  the  development  of  the 
countries  of  the  Horn  of  Africa  and  to  help  meet  the  needs  of  the  peoples 
·of  the  area; 
4.  Calls  on  the  European  Community,  in  consultation  with  the  UNHCR,  to  take 
active  measures  to  solve  the  problems  of  the  refugees  in  the  region  as 
propos~d by  the  delegation  of  the  ~uropean Parliament  in  June  1983; 
5.  Calls  on  the  Commission  to maintain  and  increase its food  aid  for  the 
countries of  the  region,  including  Sudan,  and  for  the  peoples  of  Eritrea 
and  Tigra,  both  of  them  being  severely  affected not  only  by  drought  and 
famine,  but  also  by  military  conflict,  and  to  ensure  that  the  means  of  its 
distribution are  improved; 
6.  Invites  the  European  Community  to  do  all  in  its power  to  help  Ethiopia, 
Somalia  and  the  United  Nations  High  Commissioner  for  Refugees  to  reach 
a  tripartite agreement  on  the  voluntary  repatriation  of  Ethiopian  refugees 
in  Somalia; 
7.  Asks  the  Commission  of  the  European  Communities  to  take  all  necessary  steps 
to ensure  that  the  humanitarian  aid  granted  reaches  all  the  people  affected, 
irrespective  of  their  political  sympathies; 
- 8  - PE  87.298/fin. 8.  Instructs  its President  to  forward  this  resolution  to  the  Council,  the 
Commission,  the  Foreign Ministers  meeting  in political  cooperation,  the 
Governments  of  the  Member  States,  the  parliaments  of  the  Member  States, 
the  United  Nations  High  Commissioner  f~,·  ~efugees and  the  Governments 
of  Ethiopia,  Somalia  and  Djibouti. 
- 9  - PE  87.298/fin. 8 
EXPLANATORY  STATEMENT 
Europe  cannot  remain  indifferent  to  the  tragic  events  taking  place  in  the 
Horn  of  Africa  - not  only  for  humanitarian  reasons,  but  also  for  specificall 
political  reasons.  The  conflicts  in  the  region  are  causing  unspeakable 
suffering  for  its peoples,  a  suffering  compounded  by  the  harsh  consequences 
of  chronic  underdevelopment.  furthermore,  these  conflicts,  by  engaging  the 
interest  of  the main  powers,  are  tending  to turn  the entire  region  into a 
focal  point  of  international  tension. 
For  both  these  reasons,  the  fact  that  there  are  no  discernible prospects 
of  an  early peaceful  solution  is yet  another  reason  for  concern. 
What  is more,  the political  situation in  the  Horn  of  Africa  is  compli-
cated  by  so  many  different  but  interrelated elements  that  it is extremely 
difficult to  interpret  the  facts  with  any  accuracy  and  to  move  towards 
a  solution of  the  problems. 
The  region  comprises  three  states:  Ethiopia,  Somalia  and  Djibouti. 
Apart  from  their  ethnic  and  historical  differences,  these  countries  have 
widely  differing  international  goals  and  sympathies  which  have  induced 
Ethiopia  and  Somalia  in  particular to  engage  in  ruinous  open  and 
guerrilla warfare. 
In  addition,  Ethiopia  is  a  country  which  consists  of  many  different  ethnic 
groups  and  faces  internal  difficulties  from  nationalists,  such  as  the 
Eritreans,  who  cannot  accept  the  idea of  integration  into the  Ethiopian 
State. 
This  inherent  complexity  of  the  Horn  of  Africa  is  compounded  by  other 
factors,  namely  the  equally  complex  relations  which  Ethiopia  and  Somalia 
have  with  other  countries  with  which  they  share  a  common  land  border, 
such  as  Sudan  and  Kenya,  but  also  with  other  neighbouring  countries  such 
as  South  Yemen. 
in this  introduction~ we  shall  confine  ourselves to the  main  problems, 
which  may  be  outlined as  follows: 
-.10  - PE  87.29&/fin. - ~!i!!g§:  The  Eritrean  demand  for  the  right  of  setf-deter~ination 
Led  to  the  outbreak  of  war  between  the  central  power  in  Addis 
Ababa  and  the  various  Eritrean  liberation  fronts.  This  war  has 
Lasted  twenty  years  <see  b~12w). 
Iigrg:  <together  with  Shea,  the  region  of  Tigre  forms  the 
historical  centre of  the  ancient  State of  Ethiopia).  The  Addis 
Ababa  government  is  faced  by  a  rebellious movement  which  is  de-
manding  a  Large  measure  of  autonomy. 
Qg§g~:  This  region  of  Ethiopia,  which  borders  on  Somalia  and 
is  inhabited  mainly  by  nomadic  Somali  peoples,  has  been  the  subject 
of  Somali  territorial  claims,  particularly  in  the  past.  They 
resulted  in  open  conflict  between  Ethiopia  and  Somalia  in  1977  and 
1978. 
~!!§!ggif_§QQ_~ili1§!~-~!QQlg~2_§QQ_~§iQ!_~Q~g!_§f!i~i!l_iQ_!bg 
rggigQ:  The  Horn  of  Africa  is  regarded  as  being  of  major  strategic 
importance  (control  of  the  Bab  el  Mandeb  Straits,  the  India  Ocean 
and  the  oil  routes  of  the  Persian  Gulf)  by  both  the  Western  countries 
and  the  Eastern  bloc.  The  presence  of  the  Soviet  Union,  first  in 
Somalia  and  then  in  Ethiopia,  brought  about  a  militarization of  the 
region,  the  establishment  of  a  United  States  presence  in  Somalia  and 
a  strengthening  of  the  French  presence  in  Djibouti. 
!h~-!~!~9~~-~!Q~l~~:  All  three  countries  in  the  region,  but  also 
neighbouring  Sudan,  are  more  or  less  severly  affected  by  the  prob-
Lem  of  refugee  camps,  set  up  to  cope  with  the  Large-scale  migrations 
following  the  Ethiopia-Eritrea  and  Somalia-Eritrea  conflicts. 
~Qggrgg~glQ~~gQ!_§QQ_f§~iQg:  This  is  perhaps  the  Largest  'structural' 
problem  to  be  dealt  with,  particularly  in  Ethiopia,  but  also  in 
Somalia  and  Djibouti.  Leaving  aside  the  possibility of  economic  in-
dustrial  development  in  the  future,  these  countries  are  faced  with 
the  problems  of  arid  Land,  most  of  it unfit  for  cultivation,  and 
severe  recurrent  drought,  which  constantly  threaten  the  social  co-
hesion  of  communities  which  rely  essentially on  agriculture  for 
their  Livelihood. 
- 1 'I- PE  87.298/fin. The  reasons  for  the  Somalia-Ethiopia  and  Ethiopia-Eritrea  conflicts are 
complex  and  rooted  in  the pre-colonial  and  colonial  past.  To  remove  the 
causes  today  will  therefore  be  a  very  difficult  task.  Further  complications 
arise  from  the  geo-political position of  the  Horn  of  Africa,  which  faces 
onto  the  Indian  Ocean,  is  not  far  from  the Persian Gulf  and  therefore  forms 
an  integral  part  of  the  'arc  of  crisis'.  Consequently,  in  addition to 
encouraging  fo1·eign  intervention  in  its internal  crises,  it is  deeply 
influenced  by  the  opposing  strategies of  the  main  powers,  which  take  a 
keen  interest  in  the  balance of  advantage  in  an  area  of  crucial  import-
ance. 
The  arms  race  and  the  continuous  expansion  of  military  expenditure  <which 
diverts  resources  away  from  measures  to  combat  underdevelopment)  in  the 
region  are  a  major  and  serious  aspect  of  the  crisis.  But  the  presence  of 
foreign  troops  is  equally  disturbing,  in  that  it  is  a  symptom  and  in  some 
cases  the  cause  of  the  precariousness  of  the  area's stability. 
It  is possible  to  say  that  this  'foreign'  presence  was  started  in  the 
region  by  the  arrival  of  the  Soviets  in  Somalia  at  the  end  of  the  1960s· 
(see  chapter  on  Somalia)  and  by  their  subsequent  move  to  areas  close  to 
the  Ethiopian  border. 
There  is,  of  course,  a  'qualitative'  difference  between  the  US  and  the 
USSR  presence  in  the  region:  while  Moscow,  whose  presence  also  includes 
troops  from  Cuba  and  the  Ge~man Democratic  Republic  as  well  as  Soviet 
advisers,  is  mainly  concerned  with  the  iQ!~rQ§1 affairs of  Ethiopia  and 
provides  military  support  in  the  conflict  with  Eritrea  (although  there 
is obviously  a  strat~gi~ purpose  behind  the  Soviet  presence  as  well),  the 
Americans  in  Somalia  (and  Kenya)  and  to  some  extent  the  French  in 
Djibouti  are  primarily  concerned  with  ~~!~rQ§l factors,  e.g.  control  of 
the  Indian  Ocean  and  the  Bab  el  Mandeb  Straits. 
However,  while it would  be  wrong  to assume  that  the  purpose  and  conse-
quences  of  the presence  of  these  foreign  powers  are  identical,  we  are 
bound  to  note  that  th~  freq·•~ncy  with  which  the  Local  conflicts take  on 
the  appearance  of  what  might  be  called  a  gi~Ql§r confrontation  makes  it 
all  the  more  difficult to  arrive at  a  peaceful  and  equitable  solution. 
Pr  ~7.298/tin. FolLowing  a  revolution  Led  by  the  mil·itary,  one  country  in  the  region, 
Ethiopia,  came  within  the  Soviet  sphere  of  influence  and  is  currently 
tied to  Moscow  by  a  treaty  of  friendship  and  cooperation.  Another  country, 
Somalia,  which  also  underwent  a  military-style  revolution  and  was  also 
for  a  time  closely  tied  to Moscow,  now  ~.vf~sses to be  a  defender  of 
Western  interests.  Local  alliances  ~nd alliances  formed  with  the  major 
powers  are often  contradictory,  opportunistic  and  interch~~geable.  In 
1979,  for  example,  pro-American  Kenya  and  pro-R~ssi~n  Ethid~ia concluded 
a  mutual  defence  treaty,  essentially  to  counter  the  threa~  f~om Somalia. 
The  Ethiopia-Eritrea  conflict  originated  in  the  violation by  Addis  Ababa 
of  a  United  Nations  resolution  concerning  the  arrangemerit~ for  the  de-
colonization of  Eritrea.  The  violation  ~~curred in  ~962.  The  -r~solution 
dates  back  to  19501•  The  result  has  been  a  cru~L arid b(oody  conflict 
which  raises  problems  of  principle  in  which  the  whole  of  Afric.a  feels 
involved.  Europe  has  a  clear  duty  to support  the demands  for  implement-
ation  of  the  decisions  which  were  adopted  in  an  international  forum  <and 
which  were  also  accepted  by  Ethiopia).  ~oreover,  in  view  of  the  immense 
Loss  of  Life,  the  devastation and  the  uninterrupted  flow  of  refugees 
into  countries  which  themselves  suffer  from  extreme  poverty,  Europe  must 
continue  to  hope  for  a  cessation of  hostilities  and  for  the  op~ning of 
constructive  negotiations  able  to  satisfy  ihe  demands  of  Eritrea  without, 
however,  ignoring  those  of  Ethiopia  -which  is  concerned  lest  a  settlement 
trigger  a  process  of  disintegration of  the  State - and  of  the  African 
continent  as  a  whole,  which  is  Loath  to  endorse  ter~itorial  ~hanges  imposed 
by  force.  .  ., ...  ·~"""·Bt~'·  ~~~· .,  ·r.lll¥;11,,i'IJ!Il~1·t .;  ·'.c•;lr;'l  ·~ .j;  ,  ..  ,.~,~-,~~~'\:.", . 
~~·lll'f)~·.:··'1.~  ............  ·~  +.~. ,l'  ... ,  •••  ~  ....  -~- '·  ~-:  . 
It  is perhaps  not  unrealistic  to  hope  that  a  settlement  of  th~ conflict 
which.  avoided  humiliating  Ethiopia  an4.:::1n~rJ:t  ,~~f!l~!1~~~1ff;~~~~t~c-e. ··. 
of  the peoples  and  nations  concerned  would  create  conditions  that  would 
induce  the  Soviets  and  Cubans  to  leave  the  area •. The  end  of  the  conflict 
might  also  weaken  the  role of  the  m~litary in .Addis  Ababa,  which· in turn 
might  facilitate the  start of  a  process  of  internal democratization or, 
at  Least,  the  emergence  of  a  regime  which  is more  open  and  more  willing 
to  respect  human  rights. 
1 
See  r<~ge  1?  -13- PE  87.298/fin. fhP  Somalia-Lthiopia  conflict  originated  in Mogadishu's  claims  to 
all  territories  in  adjacent  countries  inhabited by  people of  Somali 
stork.  Its  justification  is  therefore  to  be  found  in  Somali  <or 
Pan-Somali  l  national  sentiment.  The  Somali  case  nevertheless  con-
flicts  with  the  tendency  to  confirru  the  frontiers  established by  colonial-
ism,  which  everywhere  in  Africa  ·is  considered essential  in  order  to 
avoid  widespread  conflict.  Moreover,  as  in  the  days  of  empire,  present-
d3y  Ethiopia  is  a  multinational  state.  The  secession  of  Ogaden  could 
mark  the beginning  of  its disintegration,  which  would  have  unpredictable 
Gut  very  serious destabilizing  consequences. 
To  conclude,  Europe  cannot  but  be  extremely  disturbed  by  the  continuing 
state of  tension  throughout  the  Horn  of  Africa.  It  must  seek  to promote 
a  solution  which  reconciles  the  principle of  the  inviolability of 
frontiers  ,.,ith  the  rights  of  the  m·i11orities  and  the  rights of  citizenship. 
However  difficult  such  a  solution  might  seem,  the  authority  and  powers 
which  the  Community  itself or  individual  Member  States still exercise  in 
the  region  should  impel  Europe  to  introduce  joint  measures  which,  taking 
r~r:count  of  local  conditions,  woulrl  help  break  the  mould  of  bipolarism. 
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a  - From  empire  to  revolution 
Ethiopia  has  an  area  of  1,223,600  km2,  is divided  into  14  provinces 
and  is  inhabited  by  more  than  33,500,000  people  of  considerable 
ethnic  and  linguistic  divPr~ity who  settled  in  the  country  in  suc-
cessive  epochs.  By  far  the  Largest  population group  is  made  up  of 
people  of  strictly Ethiopian  stock  (the  Sidomo  and  Galla  tribes). 
Then  come  the  Somalis,  the  Tigreans  and  the  Amhara.  A few  black 
m1nor i ty  qroup,,  (Ni latE's  and  Bantus)  are  scattered over  various 
re~~ ion:;.  The  nf f i c i al  Language  is  Amharic. 
There  is  a  variety  of  religions,  which  closely  follow  ethnic  Lines: 
the  peoples  of  strictly Ethiopian  stock  adhere  to  a  Christian-Coptic 
faith,  while  the  peoples  of  the  East  and  the  South  are  for  the  most 
part  Muslims  or  animists.  The  minority  religious  groups  include  the 
Falashas,  an  ancient  Jewish  population  which  has  always  opposed  the 
Abyssinian  Negus.  Today,  the  members  of  this population  group,  which 
is  very  small,  are  often  considered  'second  class'  citizens. 
Ethiopia  is  a  member  of  the  Organization  of  African  Unity  COAU)
1
, 
the  United  Nations  and  the  group  of  African,  Caribbean  and  Pacific 
states  CACP)  associated  with  the  European  Community  through  the 
Lome  agreements. 
Ethiopia  has  an  ancient  history.  In  the  XIXth  century,  after a 
period  of  indecisive wars  between  Christian  princes,  the  Negus  (the 
supreme  authority)  unified  the  country.  With  the  opening  of  the  Suez 
Canal,  the  country  became  a  focal  point  of  rivalry  between  the 
European  powers:  the  British established  a  base  in  Aden  in  1839, 
while  the  Italians  settled  in  Eritrea  at  the  end  of  the  century  and 
the  French  settled  in  Djibouti. 
Fascist  Italy occupied  Ethiopia  in  1935  and  brought  Ethiopia,  Eritrea 
and  Somalia  into  Italian East  Africa  {IEA).  Ethiopia  won  back  its 
independence  in  1941  and  returned  Emperor  Haile  Selassie  to  power. 
Based  on  feudalism,  the  Ethiopian political  system  entered  a  crisis 
stage  in  1960  (a  crucial  year  for  many  African  states),  when  there 
were  serious  manifestations  of  student  unrest. 
1 
The  presidency  of  the  OAU  is  this  year  held  by  Ethiopia 
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and  the guerrilla activities  in  Eritrea  (see  also  the  problem  of 
Eritrea)  combined  to  heighten  tensions  within  the  country. 
In  February  1974,  owing  to  a  number  of  contingent  factors,  such  as 
an  exceptional  rise  in  the  cost  of  living  resulting  from  the  world 
economic  and  financial  crisis of  1973,  the  troops  in  Eritrea  revolted 
and  were  soon  joined  by  the  troops  stationed  in the  capital.  The 
break  between  the  government  and  the  military  rapidly  became  irrcp~rilble. 
On  12  September  1974,  the  sovereign  was  deposed. 
b  - The  new  revolutionary  government 
In  the  following  months  a  coordinating  committee  was  set  up  consisting 
of  120  military personnel  drawn  from  all  the  services  (the  DERG). 
On  22  November  1974,  the  head  of  the  Provisional  Military  Administra-
tive  Council,  Anam  Andorn,  was  assassinated,  together  with  29  civilians 
and  30  military  personnel  associated  with  the  previous  regime. 
Teferi  Bente  was  appointed  in  his  place,  assisted  by  two  vice-presidents: 
Atnafu  Abata  and  Colonel  Menghistu,  who  was  later  to  assume  power  in 
1977. 
The  new  government  summed  up  its  'philosophy'  in  the  motto  'Ethiopia 
above  all'  Cityopya  teqdam).  The  Ethiopian  Church  gave  its official 
support  to  the  new  military  government  in  1974. 
At  the  beginning  of  1975,  banks,  insurance  companies,  industries  and 
commercial  undertakings  were  nationalized.  In  March  1975,  all  agri-
cultural  land  was  nationalized  and  a  programme  of  agricultural  reform 
was  Launched,  based  on  the  creation of  Large  collective  farms  and  on 
the  granting  of  small  plots  to  individuals  for  direct  cultivation. 
c  - Current  economic  situation 
Few  data  are  available  on  Ethiopia's  economy. 
however,  that  the  situation  is  very  difficult. 
There  is  no  doubt, 
This  was  admitted  by 
the  Head  of  State,  Menghistu  Haile  Mariam,  at  the  second  congress  of 
the  Commission  for  the  Organization  of  the  Ethiopian  Workers'  Party 
<see  below).  By  far  the  most  significant  datum  in  the  agricultural 
sector  is  that,  while  the  gross  product  increased  by  4.9%  in  197Y, 
it  rose  by  only  2.4  and  2%  in  1980  and  1981  respectively.  Th1s  means 
that  the  growth  of  agriculture,  which  accounts  for  SO%  of  the  gross 
16  PE  87.298/fin. national  product  and  90%  of  exports,  has 'been  totally  inadequate. 
This  is  in  part  explained  by  the  fact  that  the  years  before  1979 
were  marked  by  a  decline  in  production.  Even  so,  in  the  early 
1980s  the  rate of  productive  growth  was  Lower  than  the  rate  of 
population  growth.  What  is  more,  in  thP  r~ral  areas  - where  con-
sumption  is  higher  tha~  in  the  past  - there  is often  no  incentive 
to  raise production  Levels:  hence  the  prevalence  of  subsistence 
farming  and  the  resulting difficulty  in  supplying  the  urban  centres. 
What  Little  surplus  there  is  is  sold  on  the  black  market  which, 
although  highly  risky  in  view  of  the  repressive  Laws,  is  the only 
way  in  which  farmers  can  be  sure of  a  reasonable  income.  According 
to  the  government,  this  unsatisfactory  situation  is  caused  by  the 
inefficiency of  the  State  farms,  which  produce  14  quintals  of  cereals 
per  hectare,  as  against  a  target  figure  of  25  quintals. 
In  the  Light  of  this  situation,  some  of  the  underlying principles 
of  the  centrally managed  agricultural  reform  of  the  military  regime 
which  succeeded  Haile  Selassie  have  already  been  called  into question, 
and  it  is  now  proposed  that  they  should  be  modified  to  enable  the 
State  to  give  support  to  small  private productive  units. 
Industry  is  in  a  worse  state  than  agriculture.  The  180  Largest  under-
takings  in  the  country  have  all  been  nationalized.  This  has  resulted 
in  a  reduction  in  production  is  absolute  terms,  even  though  a  few 
new  industries  have  been  created.  However,  there  is  far  more  concern 
about  the  agricultural  sector,  not  Least  because  the  1983  harvest  was 
disastrous  owing  to  the  drought.  It  is  clear,  finally,  that all 
the  economic  problems  are  exacerbated  by  the  current  military operations 
1n  Erit·rea  ~nd other  provinces,  since  to  finance  them  has  necessitated 
an  excessive  increase  in military  expenditure. 
d  - Current  internal  situation and  the  Soviet  presence 
Ethiopia  is  at  present  governed  by  the Provisional  Military  Administra-
tive  Council  (CMAP)  and  the  Council  of  Ministers.  Lieutenant-Colonel 
Menghistu,  who  assumed  power  in  February  1977,  is  Head  of  State  and 
President  of  the  CMAP  and  the  Council  of  Ministers. 
As  far  as  political  opposition  is  concerned,  the  regime  would  seem 
to  have  nothing  to  fear.  rhe  'red terror'  of  1978-79  completely 
de·;troyr~d  the  [thiopian  Revolutionary  Peoples'  Party  which,  although 
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government.  The  Ethiopian  Marxist  Socialist  Movement  (Messon),  on 
which  Menghistu  had  once  depended  in  his  ascent  to  power,  has  also 
been  wiped  out.  The  Ethiopian  Democratic  Union,  which  is  Led  by  a 
group  of  exiles  representing  the  old  aristocracy,  has  very  Little 
influence,  at  Least  among  the  Amhara.  There  are  certainly military 
splinter groups.  The  two  main  factions,  within  the  Derg,  the  powerful 
organ  of  state  through  which  the  armed  forces  are  able  completely 
to  control  the political  Life  of  the  country,  are probably  the  pro-
and  anti-Soviet  (or  neutral)  groups.  At  all  events,  there  is  less 
friction  between  the  various  factions  than  there  was  in  the  period 
following  the  fall  of  the  Negus,  which  was  marked  by  continuous 
internal  purges.  This  whole  process  of  relative  stabilization has 
been  made  possible  only  by  the  harshest  suppression  of  all  forms  of 
opposition,  without  the  slightest  consideration  for  human  rights. 
After  Leaving  Somalia  in  1976,  the  Soviets  formed  an  alliance  with 
Ethiopia  in  1977.  Their  intervention will  be  of  decisive  importance 
in  the  war  in  Ogaden  (see  below). 
There  are  various  reasons  for  the  Soviet  support  of  Ethiopia:  on  the 
one  hand,  there  are  strategic military  interests  (base  on  the  island 
of  Dahlak  in  the  Red  Sea),  and  on  the  other  there  are  ideological 
interests associated  with  the  strategic military  interests.  The  USSR 
seems  to  regard  Ethiopia  as  a  country  which  is  in  the  process  of 
transforming  itself  into  a  solidly  'Marxist'  state which  will  thus 
become  a  stable  'bridgehead'  in  the  African  continent,  which  on  the 
whole  has  remained  immune  to  the  Soviet  system. 
Numerically,  the  military  strength  of  the  Soviets  and  their allies 
in  Ethiopia  is  as  follows:  11,000  Cubans,  3,000  East  Germans  and 
2,500 Russians.  Today,  the  Soviets  are  the  main  suppliers  of  weapons, 
and  the  share  of  military  expenditure  in  the  Ethiopian  budget  rose 
from  2.5%  in  1974  to 10.5%  in  1980  (these  are  the  official  figures, 
but  the  real  share  is  probably  greater). 
In  December  1979,  in  conformity  with  the  wishes  of  the  Soviets,  the 
authorities  created  the  Commission  for  the Organization  of  the 
Working  Population  CCOPWE)  in  order  to  recruit  members  of  the  future 
avant-garde  party.  The  Ethiopian  Leaders  were  Less  than  enthusiastic 
about  this  development  since,  according  to  reliable  sources,  they 
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feared  that  the  organization of  a  Marxist-Leninist  party  on  a  vast 
scale  might  impose  a  system  of  popular  control  which  would  threaten 
to  undermine  the  central  power1• 
The  pro-Soviet  stance was  Largely dictated  by  a  concern  to  safeguard 
at  all  costs  the  territorial  intP3~~~~ of  the  country,  which  has  been 
threatened,  particularly since  the fall  of  the  empire,  by  the  revolt 
of  ethnic  groups  which  have  very  Little  in  common. 
The  most  serious  rebellion, politically and  militarily,  has  been  that 
mounted  by  the  Eritreans  (see  below).  Other  revolts  against  the 
central  power  are  those  Led  in  Tigre  by  the  Tigrean Peoples'  Liberation 
Front  (see  below>,  in  the  region  of  Wollo  by  the  Democratic  Ethiopian 
Peoples'  Movement,  in Oromo  (Galla>  by  the  Oromo  Liberation  Front  and 
in  Ogaden  by  the  Somalia  Liberation  Front  CFLSO). 
The  pro-Soviet  Line  was  also encouraged  by  the  indecisiveness  of .the 
Americans.  Washington  - which  had  Long  given military  support  to 
safeguard  the  unity  of  Ethiopia,  a  principal  ally of  the  USA  in  Africa 
in  the  1950s  and  1960s- is  now  reluctant  to  extend military aid  to 
Addis  Ababa  because  of  the  country's  serious  and  repeated  violations 
of  human  rights  and  its failure  to  provide  compensation  for  expropriated 
2  United  States'  property 
It  seems  that  it  was  also  on  Soviet  advice  that  Ethiopia  signed,  in 
August  1981,  a  defence  pact  with Libya  and  South  Yemen  with  a  view  to 
obtaining Libyan  capital  and  South  Yemen  military aid.  When  this  pact 
became  known,  it  was  condemned  in  some  Ethiopian  circles as  being  'against 
nature',  since,  by  inviting further  foreign  intervention  (that  of Libya 
and  South  Yemen)  in  the  Horn  of  Africa,  it merely  served  to  heighten 
internal  tensions.  It  should,  however  be  remembered  that  Soviet  military 
advisers  were  already  present  in  Ethiopia  during  the  reign  of  Haile  Selassie. 
United  States  Department  of  State,  Bureau  of  Public Affairs- Background 
Notes.  Ethiopia,  August  1981.  It  is  interesting to  note  that,  notwith-
standing  the  present  coolness  between  the  two  countries,  relations  between 
the  USA  and  Ethiopia  have  been  close  and  friendly  since  as  far  back as1900. 
This  probably  explains  why,  however  distantly,  the  US  continues  to  show 
an  interest  in  the  fate  of  Ethiopia. 
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(integrity of  the  Ethiopian State within  the  established  imperial 
boundaries,  though  with  some  dilution of  the  Amhara  hegemony)  is 
indivisible.  Consequently,  there have  been  no  signs  of  a  softeni~g 
of  the  regime's  approach  to  the  problems  of  Eritrea  and  the  other 
minorities,  nor  is it  Likely  that  there will  be  in  the  future: 
Addis  Ababa  will  do  no  more  than  offer  a  measure  of  autonomy  which, 
however,  will  be  difficult  to  reconcile  with  the  authoritarianism 
1  of  the  central  power  •  Yet  there  is evidence  of  some  discontent, 
at  least  amongst  some  members  of  the  ruling  faction,  over  the 
intentions  of  the  USSR  <which,  for  example,  is  criticized for  urging 
a  transfer  of  power  to  the  civilian authorities).  Any  shift  in  the 
country's  relations  with  the  USSR  is,  however,  inconceivable  unless 
there  is  some  prospect  of  a  so~ution to  the  Eritrean  problem  an~ 
perhaps  also,  stabilization of  the  country's borders  with  Somalia. 
As  in  the  time  of  the  Negus,  Ethiopia's  policy  is still  to  maintain 
the  status  quo.  It  is anxious  to  maintain  good  relations  with  the 
Sudan,  a  country  which  provides  a  secure  base  for  the  operations  of 
many  guerrilla movements.  Its  attempts  to destabilize  Somalia,  not 
Least  by  fomenting  agitation against  the  regime  of  Siad Barre,  are 
primarily  aimed  at  preventing  Mogadishu  from  unfurling  the  flag  of 
an  enlarged  Somalia,  bearing  in  mind  its  claims  to Ogaden.  It  is 
plainly  for  these  reasons  that  Ethiopia  sought  the  protection  of 
Moscow,  and  the  USSR  had  no  choice  but  to  accommodate  the  fundamental 
objectives  of  its African  policy  with  the  need  to  respond  to  Ethiopia's 
call  for  help. 
The  problem  of  the  countless  ethnic  groups  was  raised  in  the  1976  programme 
on  the  'Ethiopian  National  Democratic  Revolution'.  Article  5  of  this 
programme  asserted,  inter alia,  that  the  right  of  self-determination.for 
all the nationalities was  fully  acknowledged:  'This  means  that  each 
nationality  wi.LL  enjoy  the  regional  autonomy  necessary  for  it to  be  able 
to decide  matters  relating  to  its own  internal  affairs ...  '  <Basic 
Documents  of  the  Ethiopian  Revolution,  published  by  the  Provisional  Office 
for  Mass  Organization  Affairs.  Propaganda  and  Education  Committee, 
Addis  Ababa,  May  1977,  pp.  13  and  14).  Colonel  Menghistu  nevertheless 
added a  rider  to  this provision,  to  the effect  that  the  government  condemned 
all  those  who  worked  for  their personal  advantage  and  who  opposed  the  unity 
6f  the  revolutionary  state  in  the  name  of  nationalist  separatism. 
(Speech  made  in  May  1983.  See  Jo  Mayall,  'The  National  Question  in  the 
Horn  of  Africa~  in  The  World  Today,  Sept.  1983,  p.  337). 
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!he  ~e(nlor1i1Jtion of  Eritrea  - 120,000  km2  and  a  population  of  about 
3.5  million- was  hotly  contested.  The  four  main  victorious  power~  ~~ 
the  Second  World  War  failed  to  reach  agreement  on  its future,  even 
though  the  former  colonial  power,  Italy,  had  surrendered all  claims 
to  the  territory,  as  also  t~  its other  former  colonies,  with  the 
signing  of  the  peace  treaty.  It  was  not  until  1950  that  an  agreemer.t 
was  reached  in  the  United  Nations,  which  was,  however,  adopted  only 
after an  extremely  controversial  debate.  The  essence  of  this agree-
ment  was  that  Eritrea  should  form  part  of  a  federal  union  with 
Fthiopiil,  under  the  Ethiopian  Crown.  The  Federation  came  into  being 
in  1952  and  existed,  despite  various  vicissitudes,  for  a  decade1 
In  1962,  following  military  intervention  by  Ethiopia,  the  Eritrean 
parliament  was  dissolved.  The  Federation  then  ceased  to exist  and 
Eritrea  Lost  its autonomy,  becoming  a  mere  province  of  the  empire. 
From  the  point  of  view  of  international  law,  the  Ethiopian  action  was 
totally  illegal,  since  it  violated  an  unequivocal  resolution of  the 
United  Nations.  It  also  violated  the  principle,  which  is  one  of  the 
most  solid bases  of  relations  between  the  African  countries,  of  the 
inviolability of  the  colonial  frontiers,  bearing  in  mind  that  at  the 
time  of  the  final  decision  the  identity of  Eritrea  was  separate  from 
that  of  Ethiopia.  What  is bitterly contested  is  the  specious  national-
istic  justification of  Ethiopia's action,  since  there  are  undeniable 
historical  and  cultural  differences  between  the  Eritrean  and  Ethiopian 
peoples  (identifiable  with  the different  ethnic  groups  which  had  some-
how  been  brought  together  under  the  controlling  influence  of  the 
Ethiopian  empire  over  many  centuries).  The  action  was  also  politically 
unacceptable,  inasmuch  as  it  resulted  in  internal  repression  and 
regional  destabilization. 
The  annexation  of  Eritrea  provoked  the  formation  of  an  armed 
resistance  movement.  This  was  initially organized  by  the  Eritrean 
Liberation  Front  (FLE).  The  movement  gathered  strength  over  the  years, 
receiving  the  full  support  of  the  population.  At  the  same  time, 
United  Nations,  resolutions  adopted  by  the  General  Assembly  over  the 
period  19  September  to  15  December  1950.  General  Assembly,  official 
documents:  fifth  session,  Supplement  No.  20  (A/1775),  p.  22 
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in  the  creation of  countless  splinter  groups.  The  FLE  has  ceased 
to  be  the  dominant  political  and  military  group.  The  group  which 
has  most  successfully  extended  its  influence  over  the  territory  and 
the  population  is  the  Eritrean Peoples'  Liberation  Front  (FPLE). 
Then  there  are  the  peoples'  Liberation  movements,  as  well  as  other 
smaller  groupings.  Broadly  speaking,  the  FLE  derives  its inspiration 
from  Islam,  while  the  FPLE  is  of  Marxist  persuasion.  The  ultimate 
aim  of  all  these  groups  is  independence  for  Eritrea.  They  have 
repeatedly  striven  to settle their differences  <which  hinge  on  the 
social  order  to  be  established  by  Eritrea  once  it  has  won  independence). 
But,  although  there  have  been  formal  declarations  of  reconciliation, 
the  disagreements  have  persisted.  There  have  been  frequent  bloody 
skirmishes  between  the  different  guerrilla movements,  particularly 
in  recent  times.  It  is  perhaps  because  of  these  conflicts  that  the 
Eritrean  Liberation  fronts  have  never  attempted  to  set  up  a  govern-
ment  in  exile  or  in  the  'Liberated'  territories. 
Although  there  are  no  formal  contacts  between  them,  the Eritrean 
guerrilla movements  and  Somalia  found  that  they  had  enough  in  common 
to  Launch,  in  1977,  a  joint  offensive  against  the  Addis  Ababa  central 
government.  This  offensive  was  replused after  Little more  than  a 
year's  fighting.  The  Eritrean objectives are,  however,  very different 
from  the  objectives  of  the  Somalis.  The  former,  unlike  the  Latter, 
are  clearly  justified from  the  point  of  view  of  international  Law. 
Nevertheless,  Eritrea's demand  for  independence  gives  rise  to  contra-
dictions,  since  Ethiopia  has  invoked  the  UN's  mandatory  'federal' 
decision  and,  on  the  basis  of  that  decision,  insists  that  the  problem 
should  be  considered  as  a  strictly  internal  one.  Moreover,  since 
fully  twenty  years  have  elapsed  since  the  annexation  of  Eritrea, 
the  principle of  the  inviolability of  frontiers  might  easily  be  re~ 
interpreted  to  strengthen  the  arguments  of  those  who  favour  maintaining 
the  status  quo.  The  arguments  of  the  Eritreans,  it  should  be  added, 
carry more  credence  with  the  Arab  states  than  with  the  OAU  from  which, 
indeed,  they  have  never  evoked  much  sympathy. 
As  ~r as  the  military operations  are  concerned,  these  are  not  achieving 
the  results  which  Addis  Ababa  had  hoped:  the  'red star'  operation, 
Launched  in  1982,  has  more  or  Less  failed,  while  in  February  1983  the 
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the  Tigrean  revolt  gathered  considerable  momentum  (see  below)1. 
Notwithstanding  the  presence  and  the  military  aid of  the  Eastern 
bloc  countries,  it  is  apparently extremely difficult  tor  the  Ethiopians 
to  win  an  outright  military victory.  The  Eritrean terrain  is  unsuited 
to  tank  offensives  and  ;~  ~ure favourable  to guerrilla warfare operations 
such  as  those  carried  out  in  Afghanistan.  The  Ethiopian  troops  h~ve 
used  Soviet  MI-24  heLicopters  and  have  .been  accused  by  the  Eritrean 
Peoples'  Liberation  Front  CFPLE)  of  having  used  toxic  gases.  These 
accusations  have  been  denied  by  the  Addis  Ababa  government  and 
Western  observers  in  the  Ethiopian  capital  hav~ not  been  able  to 
establish  the  ~ruth of  the  matter2• 
It seems,  moreover,  that  the  Soviet  Union  is  reluctant  to  become 
deeply  involved  in  the  Eritrean  problem.  Indeed,  the  'red star' 
operation  was  not  approved  by  the  Soviets  and  observers  have  pointed 
out  that  if  Addis  Ababa  were  to  succeed  in  settling once  and  for  all 
the  Eritrean  problem  by  force  of  arms,  it  ~auld strengthen  the  position 
of  the  nationalist  factions  in  the  DERG  and  in  the  army,  which  for 
3  the  most  part  has  heen  antipa~hetic to  the  Soviet  presence  . 
Aside  from  the military  measures,  there  is  an  economic  objective  in 
Menghistu's  strat~gy, which  is to  'rebuild Eritrea',  the  aim  being 
to  weaken  the  resolve  of  the  rebels  by  offering  an  alternative  course 
to  the  Eritrean people  which  would  involve  improving  their  standard 
of  Living  etc.  The  achievement  of  such  an  objective  would  be  plainly 
difficult, both  because  of  the  enormous  destruction  caused  by  the  war 
and  because  the prevailing situation  is  a  disincentive to  investment4• 
The  northern  regic1n  of  lritrea  is still outside  the  control  of  Addis  Ababa, 
but  it  now  seems  that  military activities  there  have  been  immobilized 
owing  to  Lack  of  support  for  the  Eritreans  (see  Le  Monde,  29.~0.1983) 
See  Le  Monde,  26.3.1982 
See  Le  Monde,  23.3.1982 
It  once  seemed  Likely  that  assistance for  the  rebuilding  of  Eritrea 
would  come  from  Libya  CLe  Monde,  23.3.1982),  but  this  now  seems  out  of  the 
question  because  of  the  financial  difficulties  recently experienced  by 
Libya.  For  1982,  Ethiopia  had  earmarked  10%  of  its budget  for  Eritrea 
CLe  Monde,  op.  cit.) 
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The  Eritrean  Liberation  movements  receive  very  Little aid  from 
other  countries.  The  United  States  is  unwilling  to  get  caught  up 
in  the  conflict,  apparently  for  two  reasons.  Firstly,  it  is  Likely 
that  Israel  would  be  hostile  to  US  intervention,  since  it would  not 
Like  to  see  the  establishment  of  another  Arab  state  in  the  area  of 
the  straits  Leading  into  the  Red  Sea.  Secondly,  the  USA  is  con-
vinced  that,  since  the  Soviet  system  is  unpalatable  to Africa  as 
a  whole,  the  end  of  the  Eritrean  revolt  would  induce  the  Soviet:;  to 
withdraw  from  Ethiopia,  just  as  they  have  already  been  forced  to 
withdraw  from  Egypt,  the  Sudan  and  Somalia1. 
In  these  circumstances,  the  Eritreans  have  obtained  what  Little 
support  they  have  from  certain  Arab  states,  which  are  nevertheless 
antagonistic  to  the principle  so  firmly  defended  by  the Organization 
of  African  Unity  COAU),  that  of  the  inviolability of  the  frontiers 
established at  the  end  of  the  colonial  period  (see  below). 
Nevertheless,  the  Sudan  has  played  a  major  part  in  the  conflict  by 
allowing  the  Eritrean  liberation forces  to  take  refuge  on  Sudanese 
territory.  Although  there  have  been  attempts  to  reconcile  the 
interests of  Ethiopia  and  the  Sudan,  the  results  have  been  diiappointing 
and  the  situation between  the  two  countries  today  is  one  of  stale-
mate.  The  Sudan  has  recently  accused  Ethiopia  of  support.ing  the 
rebel  forces  in  the  south2• 
In  sum,  the  war  in  Eritrea  is  a  source  of  tensions  and  severe 
economic  and  social  problems,  not  just  because  there  is still  no 
prospect  of  an  end  to  the  conflict,  but  also  because  it  has  created 
an  enormous  refugee  problem.  There  are  at  least  500,000  refugees, 
most  of  whom  have  been  taken  in  by  the  Sudan  (see  below). 
f  - The  problem  of  Tigre 
In  mid-February  1983,  the  DERG  Launched  a  widescale  offensive 
against  the  Tigrean  Peoples'  Liberation  Front  CFLPT),  deploying 
40,000  troops  and  heavy  artillery. 
See  Andre  Fontaine,  Le  Monde,  25.2.1982 
See  page  26 
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Unlike  Eritrea,  the  Tigrean  anti-government  forces  have  repeatedly 
declared  that  they  have  no  wish  for  total  independence  from  Addis 
Ababa,  but  simply  a  Large  measure  of  autonomy.  Furthermor'?,  cllt'H 
motives  would  appear  to  be  grounded  in  extreme  Left-wing  ideologies.  The 
FLPT  professes  to  be  a  ~1a rx i st-Leni n; sc  .novement.  Even  so,  there  has 
been  mutual  assistance  between  the Eritrean Peoples'  Liberation 
front  CFPLE)  and  the  FLPT  and  it  was  this  Link,  perhaps  forged  by 
incidental  factors,  which  in  1982  enabled  the  Eritreans,  inter alia, 
to  stave off  the  'red star'  offensive. 
g  - The  problem  of  Ogaden 
The  Ogaden  problem  brought  open  conflict,  in  1977-78,  between  Somalia 
and  Ethiopia. 
Ogaden  is  inhabited  by  peoples  of  Somali  ethnic  origin,  and  it has 
always  been  Somalia's  objective  to  reintegrate  these  peoples  into 
its  own  territory,  in pursuit  of  its policy  of  creating  an  enlarged 
Somali  state  (see  chapter  on  Somalia). 
In  1977,  the  Somali  regular  army  invaded  Ogaden  and  came  close  to 
routing  the  Ethiopian forces.  The  Soviet  intervention  on  the  side 
of  Addis  Ababa  proved  to  be  of  vital  importance,  since  it enabled 
tanks  to be  airlifted to  Ogaden  to  repulse  the  Somali  army  and  re-
conquer  the  region. 
This  Soviet-mounted  operation  was  seen  to  be  extremely  important, 
not  Least  from  the  military  point  of  view,  since  it entailed,  perhaps 
for  the  first  time,  the  use  of  a  rapid  deployment  force  on  the  part  of 
the  Soviets. 
The  Soviet  intervention  was  condemned  by  the  Islamic  Foreign  Ministers 
Conference,  held  in  Islamabad  from  27  to  29  January  1980,  in  a 
resolution which  denounced  'the  armed  aggression  against  the  Somali 
Democratic  Republic'  as  well  as  the  presence  of  the  Soviet  Union  and 
of  some  of  its allies  in  the  Horn  of  Africa.  The  resolution called, 
inter alia,  for  the  withdrawal  of  the  foreign  bases  in  the  Horn  of 
Africa1. 
Keesing's  Contemporary  Archives,  p.  30242,  1980.  The  condemnation  of 
Ethiopia  may  be  explained  by  the  fact  that  Somalia  is  an  Arab  country. 
Moreove~ the  Islamic  Conference  is  strongly  anti-Soviet 




In  August  1980,  a  six-point  resolution  was  adopted  by  an  OAU  commission 
meeting  in  Lagos.  It  called attention,  inter alia,  to  the  principle 
of  the  inviolability of  the  frontiers  of  OAU  member  states,  as  drawn 
at  the  time  of  independence1• 
The  OAU  continued  to act  as  a  mediator.  In  June  1981,  the  Assembly 
of  Heads  of  State  and  of  Government  of  the  OAU  adopted,  despite 
Somali  objections,  a  resolution  affirming  that  Ogaden  was  'an  integral 
part  of  Ethiopia' 2. 
Nevertheless,  Somalia  continued  to  support  the guerrilla  forces  of 
the  Western  Somalia  Liberation  Front  (FLSO),  while  proclaiming  that 
it did  not  seek  territorial  aggrandizement  (see  chapter  on  Somalia). 
The  attitude  of  the  Mogadishu  government  is  that  the  Ogaden  Somalis 
should  have  the  right  of  self-determination  and  that  it  should  be  up 
to the  FLSO  to decide,  once  independence  has  been  gained,  whether 
Ogaden  should  be  united  with  Somalia  or  a  new  state  created3. 
The  question  of  the  fate  of  Ogaden  nevertheless  remains  open.  In 
1982,  Ethiopian  forces  crossed  the  frontier  into  Somalia  and  occupied 
two  villages,  Balanballe  and  Goldogob.  These  have  still not  been 
returned  to  Somalia4 • 
Africa  Research  Bulletin,  August  1980,  pp.  5763  and  5764.  The  members  of 
the  OAU  commission  are:  Nigeria,  Tanzania,  Senegal,  Liberia,  Cameroon, 
the  Sudan,  Mauritania  and  Lesotho,  which  was  not  represented  at  the  Lagos 
meeting. 
Keesing's  Comtemporary  Archives,  p.  31055 
See  IL  Messaggero,  19.10.1983 
Le  Monde,  25.11.1983 
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Somalia  won  independence  in 1960  following  the  fusion  of  the  former 
Italian  colony  and  the  fo~mer British  Somaliland  Protectorate. 
In  1969,  following  the  assassination of  the  President  of  the  Re-
public,  the  army  seized  power. 
Following  this  coup  d'etat,  which  was  Led  by  the  current  President, 
Siad Barre,  the  1960  Constitution  was  suspended  and  a  new  govern-
ment  formed  by  the  Supreme  Revolutionary  Council. 
In  October  1970,  President  Barre  pronounced  Somalia  to  be  a 
socialist  state and  began  to  prepare  a  revolutionary  programme 
of  national  unification  and  economic  and  social  reform. 
In  July  1976,  the  Supreme  Revolutionary  Council  was  dissolved  and 
its powers  were  transferred  to  the  new  party:  the  Somali  Revolu-
tionary  Socialist  Party  CSRSP). 
In  1979,  a  new  Constitution  was  introduced.  The  127-member 
Peoples'  Assembly  met  for  the  first  time  in  January  1980. 
In  October  of  the  same  year,  President  Barre  declared  a  state 
of  emergency  on  the  grounds  that  'opportunistic  elements'  were 
posing  a  threat  to  national  stability.  This  state of  emergency 
was  ended  in  March  1982. 
As  far  as  internal  policy  is  concerned,  after  a  period  of 
'scientific socialism',  the  regime  turned  its attention  to  the 
privatization of  various  sectors of  the  economy. 
The  authorities also  initiated a  rapid  process  of  'Arabization' 
throughout  the  country.  By  contrast  with  Ethiopia,  Somalia  has 
no  ethnic  problems  of  the  kind  which  would  complicate  relations 
between  the  State  and  society.  President  Siad  Barre  recently 
declared  that  'we  are  a  homogeneous  nation  in  every  respect•1 
Deep-rooted  tribal  tensions  nevertheless  exist. 
Summary  of  World  Broadcasts,  5  July  1983. 
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Since  1964,  Somalia  has  laid  claim  to  the  Ethiopian  territory of 
Ogaden  (see  above)  and  to  some  territories of  neighbouring  Kenya, 
both  of  which  are  inhabited  by  peoples  of  Somali  ethnic  origin1• 
These  claims  are  said  to  form  the  basis  of  a  policy  aimed  at 
creating  an  'enlarged  Somalia',  which,  moreover,  was  prefigured 
in  the  Bevin  Plan  of  the  post-war  era.  Furthermore,  the  1979 
Constitution affirms  the  support  of  the  Somali  State  for  'the 
Liberation  of  the  Somali  territories still under  the  yoke  of 
colonial  oppression'.  For  the  present,  however,  the  Somali 
government's  avowed  intention  is  not  to  pursue  its territorial 
l 
.  2  c  a1ms  . 
Relations  between  Somalia  and  the  Soviet  Union  became  much  closer 
in  1969,  when  the  army  seized power  and  a  socialist  state was 
proclaimed. 
The  heavy  dependence  of  the  Somali  army  on  the  Soviets  for 
necessary  equipment  and  training  increased  the  influence  of  the 
USSR,  which  in  turn  obtained  for  the  Somalis  various  military 
'facilities'  and,  in particular,  use  of  the  Berbera  naval  base. 
The  Peoples'  Republic  of  China  financed  a  series of  civilian 
projects. 
In  May  1977,  the  Western  Somalia  liberation  Front  (FLSO)  launched 
an  offensive  in  Ogaden,  with  substantial  support  from  the  Somali 
government.  The  Soviets,  for  their part,  were  already  prepared 
to fill  the  power  vacuum  in  Ethiopia  and,  with  their  support  and 
Cuban  backing,  the  Addis  Ababa  army  was  able  to  turn  the  tables 
in  a  war  that  had  at  first  seemed  lost. 
In  November  1977,  following  promises  from  Saudi  Arabia  of  financial 
aid  for  the acquisition of  military  equipment,  on  condition  that 
In  December  1980,  following  a  visit  by  Menghistu  to  Kenya,  the  final 
communique  called on  Somalia  to  renounce  its territorial  claims  in 
respect  of  Ethiopia,  Kenya  and  Djibouti  (Africa  Research  Bulletin, 
1-31  August  1980,  p.  5764). 
James  Mayell,  op.  cit., p.  339 
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it  broke  with  the  USSR,  and  friendly  overtures  from  the  United 
St~tes,  Somalia  broke  off  relations  with  Cuba,  abandoned  the 
treaty  of  friendship  with  the  Soviet  Union  and  expelled  6,000 
Soviet  personnel  from  its  territory. 
In  1978,  the  United  States  extended  financial  aid  to  the  Siad 
Barre  regime,  while  refraining 
it  with  military assistance. 
~Lhe  time  being  from  providing 
On  22  August  1980,  on  the  strength of  an  exchange  of  notes  between 
Washington  and  Mogadishu,  the  United  States  was  allowed  access  to 
expanding  naval  and  air  'facilities'. 
The  Reagan  Administration  has  increased  economic  and  military aid 
to  Somalia,  to  the  extent  that,  with  an  allocation of  91.3  million 
doLLars,  it  now  ranks  third  among  the  African  countries  in  receipt 
of  US  assistance1. 
American  diplomacy  is,  however,  faced  with  a  difficult dilemma: 
how  can  it  reconcile  support  for  Somalia  with  possible  future 
cooperation  with  Ethiopia,  which  has  Latterly  manifested  a 
desire  to  improve  its  relations  with  Western  countries2
? 
It  is  clear  that  Ethiopia's  economic  performance  would  make  such 
an  improvement  rather difficult:  exports  have  fallen  while  the 
cost  of  imports  has  risen,  notably  as  a  result  of  the  increase 
in  the  price  of  oil.  Moreover,  the  balance  of  payments  deficit 
and  the  external  debt  are  increasing at  an  equal  pace. 
Sudan  is  the  chief  beneficiary  ($  230  million),  followed  by  Kenya 
($  112.5  million). 
See  James  Mayall,  op.cit.,  pp.341  to  343. See  also  the  vis~ of  th~ 
Ethiopian  Foreign  Affairs  Minister  to  the  United  Nations  amhis  contacts 
with  the  US  State  Department. 
In  1982,  following  the  Ethiopian  incursions  into  Soma~ia,  the  Uni~ed 
States  supplied  Mogadishu  with  defensive military  equ1pment,  but  1t 
:>tiLt  refuses  to  provide  heavy  arms.  Since  February  1983,  however,  some 
forty  US  military  instructors  have  been  helping  to  train  the  Somali 
army  (Le  Monde,25.11.1983). 
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Mohammed  Siad Barre,  has  been  challenged within  the  ruling  junta. 
Both  in  the  party  and  in  the  armed  forces,  the  two  centres  of 
power,  there  has  been  growing  dissent,  with  the  result  that  there 
have  been  a  few  abortive  attempts  to  overthrow  the  government. 
There  has  also  been  an  increase  in guerrilla activity,  aimed  not 
simply  at  removing  Siad  Barre,  but  at  making  sweeping  changes  in 
the  regime  as  a  whole. 
The  anti-government  guerrilla movement  poses  a  serious  challenge 
to  the  regime.  It  is  aided  by  Ethiopia  which,  after 1980, 
considered  that  to  foment  subversion within  Somalia's  borders 
would  be  the  most  effective  way  of  preventing  Mogadishu  from  en-
couraging  fresh  uprisings  in  Ogaden  against  the  Addis  Ababa 
central  government.  Siad  Barre  has  repeatedly  denounced  the  in-
cursions  by  Ethiopian  troops  into  Somali  territory  and  has  also 
spoken  of  direct  confrontations  between  the  regular  armies  of 
the  two  countries.  However,  Ethiopia  seems  unwilling  to  commit 
itself to  a  direct  invasion of  Somalia;  it prefers  to  act 
through  the  intermediary  of  opposition  movements. 
This  form  of  Ethiopian  intervention  has  met  with  a  measure  of 
support  within  Somalia,  not  so  much  on  political  grounds  (rejec-
tion  of  certain anti-Ethiopian  decisions  taken  by  Siad  Barre) 
as  for  tribal  reasons.  Siad  Barre  relies for  support  on 
his  own  tribe,  the  Meharans.  Until  very  recently,  the 
m·ost  powerful  guerrilla organization  was  the  Somali 
Deliverance  Front,  founded  in  Addis  Ababa  in  1979. 
Its  strength  derived  primarily  from  the  Mijurtein tribe.  In 
1981,  it  combined  with  two  Lesser  groups  to  form  the  Democratic 
Front  for  the  Deliverance  of  Somalia,  a  movement  which  was  sub-
sequently  weakened  by  internal  dissension. 
At  present,  the  strongest  anti-government  group  is  the  Somali 
National  Movement,  which  was  founded  in  London  in  1980.  Its 
ethnic  composition  is  predominantly  Ishaak. 
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Djibouti  has  an  area  of  21,  783  km2  and  a  population of  350,000. 
The  main  ethnic  groups  are  the  Afars  and  the  Issas,  but  there  are 
also  Somali,  Arab  and  European  minoritiP~. 
According  to  a  United  Nations  Development  Programme  CUNDP)  report, 
most  of  the  Djibouti  peoples  live  in  conditions  of  dire  poverty. 
The  rural  population  is  'one  of  the  poorest  in  East  Africa'  and 
'extreme  poverty  also exists  in  the  Djibouti  urban  agglomeration'. 
90%  of  the  territory  is desert.  Virtually all  the  rest  is  given 
over  to  grazing.  Only  6,000  hectares,  corresponding  to 0.26%  of 
the  territory,  is fit  for  cultivation,  but  none  of  this  land  is 
irrigated.  In  1981,  agricultural  output  covered  a  mere  3%  of  the 
country's  food  requirements.  Independent  for  just  six  years, 
Djibouti  lacks  even  the  rudiments  of  an  industrial  structure. 
Its economy  is  focused  entirely on  the  tertiary  sector.  Activity 
is concentrated  in  four  sectors:  building  and  public  works,  trans-
port  and  telecommunications,  services,  and  commerce.  Virtually 
everything  has  to  be  imported,  with  the  inevitable  result  that  the 
country  suffers  from  a  chronic  balance  of  trade deficit.  At  only 
6.4%,  the  ratiJ of  exports  to  imports  is disastrous. 
This  small  'enclave'  owes  its economic  survival  to  its geographical 
position.  Djibouti  is  in  an  ideal  position  to  control  the  Bab  el 
Mandeb  Straits,  the  point  at  which  the  Red  Sea  and  the  Indian 
Ocean  meet.  It  was  hoped  to  turn  the  Port  of  Djibouti  into the 
Hong  Kong  of  East  Africa,  but  Djibouti  has  now  been  overtaken,  in 
terms  of  volume  of  trade,  by  the  Port  of  Jedda,  whose  expansion 
in  recent  years,  together  with  the  decline  in  the  importance  of 
the  Stlet  Canal,  has  been  a  serious  blow  to  the  country's  economy. 
The  railway  Linking  the  Port  of  Djibouti  with  Ethiopia  is of  key 
importance,  in  that  it  is  used  to  transit  60%  of  Ethiopia's 
exports.  Closed  during  the  Ogaden  war  (1977-1978),  this  railway 
is  now  again  functioning  normally  thanks  to  French  aid. 
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80%  of  the  country's  imports  and  is  by  far  the  most  important  con-
tributor  to  cooperation  schemes  <education,  health,  etc.).  Expen-
diture  by  French  residents  accounts  for  50  and  75%  of  the  value 
added  in  the  commercial  sector  and  the  services  sector  respectively. 
The  financial  aid  provided  by  the  Arab  countries  <about  100  million 
dollars  a  year)  is  also useful,  though  not  decisive,  to  the 
economy. 
Politically,  the  country  seems  to  have  achieved  a  measure  of 
stability under  the  leadership  of  President  Hassan  Gouled.  In 
the  years  before  and  immediately  after  independence,  there  was 
acute  tension  between  the  two  ethnic  communities,  the  Afars  and  the 
Issas  (the  Latter  are  of  Somali  stock).  This  arose  because  the 
Afars,  who  had  enjoyed  a  privileged position  in  the  colonial  era, 
were  forced  into  a  somewhat  subordinate  role  compared  with  the  Issas 
thanks  to  a  shift  in  the  balance of  power  and  influence  during  the 
period  in  question.  Hassan  Gouled  succeeded,  however,  in  averting 
civil  war.  As  part  of  his  policy  of  national  reconciliation,  he 
brought  prominent  members  of  the  Afar  community  into  the  government 
<the  Prime  Minister  is  an  Afar)  and  created,  1n  1981,  an  institutional 
structure based  on  the  single party. 
Relations  with  Ethiopia  and  Somalia  are particularly delicate.  Each 
of  these  two  countries  has  always  feared  that  the  other  wished  to 
exploit  Djibouti  to  its own  advantage.  Addis  Ababa  was  particularly 
keen  on  the  maintenance  of  the  French  colonial  presence,  which  safe-
guarded  the  operation  of  the  Ethiopia-Djibouti  railway,  while  thwarting 
the  expansionist  claims  of  Mogadishu.  Somalia,  on  the  other  hand,  pressed 
for  the  country's  independence,  ~1i t hout  disguising  its  hope  that it would  one 
day  be  incorporated  into  the  Republic  of  Somalia.  Between  1977  and 
1980,  Ethiopia  encouraged  Afar  opposition  to  Hassan  Gouled  (then  a 
popular  figure  among  the  Somalis).  The  Ojaden  war,  which  forced  the 
shutdown  of  the  Addis  Ababa-Djibouti  railway  and  saw  an  unprecedented 
increase  in  support  for  the  idea  of  an  enlarged  Somalia,  changed  and 
to  some  extent  reversed  the  situation.  Politically,  Djibouti  has 
drawn  closer  to  Ethiopia  and  distanced  itself  from  Mogadishu. 
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Although  it may  be  seen  as  a  sort of  second  Somali  state,  it mis-
trusts  Somalia.  In  international  forums,  it  has  always  striven to 
maintain  a  neutral  stance,  seeking to  build up  alliances  in  order  to 
escape  the  vice-like  gri~ of  its two  more  powerful  neighbours. 
This  explains  why  it  joined  the  Arab  League.  At  all  events,  Djibouti 
remains  a  solidly pro-Western  country.  The  coope;ation  agreements 
with  France  provide,inter alia,  for  the  stationing of  4,500  French 
soldiers  on  its territory.  Djibouti  has  also granted  the  American 
fleet  access  to  its port. 
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which  seemed  imminent  two  years  ago,  following  the  abandonment 
of  the  grandiose  projects  elaborated  in  the  1970s  with  the  aim 
of  making  the  Sudan  the  granary  of  the  Arab  world  with  mas~ive 
assistance  from  the  Arab  Funds  and  OPEC,  has  been  averted,  but  a 
number  of  economic  distortions  have  been  accentuated  and  given 
rise  to  contradictions  which  represent  a  grave  threat  to  the 
country's  stability. 
International  Monetary  Fund  sources  indicate that  President 
Gaafar  El  Nimeri  has  succeeded  in  arresting  the  surge  in  the 
foreign  debt,  which  at  present  amounts  to  7,800  million dollars. 
However,  he  has  been  unable  to  start  the  process  of  reducing  the 
debt,  which  continues  to  place  a  very  heavy  burden  on  the 
national  exchequer.  By  concentrating all  its energies  on  restor-
ing  the  balance  of  payments  and  on  meeting  the  demands  of  inter-
national  creditors,  the  government  finds  that  it must  pursue  an 
economic  policy  which,  by,  for  example,  abolishing  subsidies 
aimed  at  holding  down  the  prices  of  various  staple  goods,  has 
caused  deep  resentment  and  outbreaks  of  violent  protest. 
A number  of  distortions  which  have  emerged  in  the  past  two  years cast 
serious  doubts  on  the  ability of  the  Sudanese  economy  to  survive  for 
very  much  Longer.  The  principal  distortion arises  from  the  un-
certain  role  of  the  country's million  or  so  emigrants,  most  of 
whom  now  work  in  the  rich  countries  of  the  Gulf.  These  workers 
have  done  much  to  help  make  good  the  Lack  of  hard  currency  and  to 
sustain  the  Local  currency  through  their  income  transfers.  How-
ever,  the  fall  in oil  revenue  in  the  Emirates  has  forced  them  to 
curtail their  development  programmes.  In  consequence,  many 
Sudanese  migrants  will  be  made  redundant  and  compelled  to  return 
home,  where  all  that  awaits  them  is  unemployment  or  a  paltryr 
subsistence1 wage  of  about  23  dollars  a  month. 
The  main  agricultural  products  are  cotton  and  sugar.  Output  of 
both  products  has  risen  considerably  over  the  Last  year,  which 
will  enable  the  government  to  make  substantial  cuts  in  imports. 
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be  exploited,  in  the  southern  regions  of  the  country  has 
revived  the  ancient  quarrel  between  the  central  government  in 
Khartoum,  which  represents  the  ;~~:~~~ts of  the  North,  and  the 
South.  EL  Nimeri  hds  altered  the  boundary  Lines  of  the  southern 
provinces,  which  secured  a  measure  of  autonomy  after  a  Long  war, 
so  as  to bring  the  main  fields  within  the  borders  of  the  northern 
provinces.  He  has  also  decided  that  the  refinery  to  process  the 
crude  oil  produced  is  to  be  built  in  the  North.  ALL  this  has 
.  1 
created acute  tensions  between  the  northern  and  southern  provinces 
The  conflict  between  the  Arab  Muslim  peoples  of  the  North  and 
the  black  peoples  (predominantly  animists,  but  including  a 
minority  Christian  element)  of  the  South  is the  dominant  theme 
of  Sudanese  domestic  policy,  and  indeed  the  acid test  of  the 
ability of  all  governments  in  the  region.  The  Sudan  is  the  largest 
country  of  the  African  continent.  It brings  into very  close  contact 
two  very  different  civilizations,  the  Arabs  and  the blacks,  between 
whom  there  are  frequent  bitter confrontations.  For  many  years 
after  independence,  which  Left  political  control  of  the  country  in 
the  hands  of  the  Arabs,  the  Sudan  was  racked  by  bloody  civil  war. 
This  ended  in  1972  thanks  to  an  agreement  which  bestowed  a  large 
measure  of  autonomy  on  the  South,  which  was  divided  into  three 
provinces.  For  some  years  this  new  arrangement  worked  reasonably 
smoothLy.  But  relations  eventually deteriorated,  especially 
after  1981.  Many  members  of  the  Southern  Regional  Assembly  were 
arrested,  including  its vice-president.  The  Council  for  the  Unity 
of  South  Sudan,  set  up  to  oppose  the  administrative  reform  pro-
posed  by  El  Nimeri,  was  dissolved,  after being  accused  of  violating 
the  Law  banning  the  formation  of  political parties outside  the 
Sudanese  Socialist  Union.  These  events  were  followed  by  a  resump-
. tion  of  guerrilla warfare.  The  Khartoum  government  denounced  the 
resurgence  of  'banditry'.  Even  the  reliability of  the  Northern 
forces  is  uncertain.  The  years  1980  to  1982  saw  important  new 
developments:  the  dissolution of  Parliament,  new  elections 
(based  on  a  single  List),  a  total  reorganization  of  the  party, 
These  tensions  have  been  exacerbated  by  El  Nimeri's  decision  to  extend 
the  application of  Islamic  Law  to  the  south  of  the  country. 
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President.  Left-wing  parties  and  trade  unions  were  destroyed 
by  El  Nimeri,  who  now  enjoys  the  support  of  the  Muslim  (inte-
grationist)  Right,  which,  however,  does  not  always  see  eye  to 
eye  with  the  army,  which  remains  the  ultimate  arbiter  of  the 
country's  fate. 
c  - fQ[~ig~_gQlifl 
The  Sudan  has  always  had  very  close  - and  in  some  respects 
'obligatory'  -ties with  Egypt  <which  for  years  actually  con-
tested  its  right  to  independence).  As  far  as  international 
alliances  are  concerned,  Sudanese  policy  follows  unerringly 
that  adopted  by  Cairo.  The  two  countries  have  a  mutual  aid  agree-
ment.  Like  Egypt,  the  Sudan  is  now  pro-Western  (very  good  re-
Lations  with  the  USA,  which  has  offered  to  guarantee  its security 
under  certain  conditions)  and  stands  firmly  opposed  to Libya. 
EL  Nimeri  sees  Tripoli  as  a  source of  internal  subversion. 
Relations  with  Ethiopia  have  invariably  been  tense.  Both  countries 
have  attempted  to  exploit  their  respective  secessionist  movements 
to  the  detriment  of  each  other.  Up  to  1972,  Ethiopia  provided  a 
secure  base  for  the  southern  guerrillas  (the  Anya-Nya),  who  also 
enjoyed  the  support  of  Israel.  In  1972,  peace  was  restored  to 
the  southern  regions  through  the  mediation  of  Haile  Selassie  which 
resulted  in  an  agreement  between  Khartoum  and  Addis  Ababa.  The 
Ethiopian  revolution  did  much  to  damage  relations  between  the  two 
countries,  especially  when  it  took  the  form  of  a  pro-Soviet  move-
ment.  The  desire  of  both  sides  to  avoid  an  armed  conflict  has, 
however,  always  Led  to  moderation  and  negotiation  (as  well  as  to 
the  conclusion  of  more  or  Less  Lasting  agreements)  whenever  the 
situation  has  threatened  to  get  completely  out  of  control. 
The  Sudan  is willing  to  harbour  a  few  anti-Ethiopian  g1Jerrillu 
movements,  particularly  if  they  are  Eritrean.  In  general,  however, 
its attitude  to  such  movements  is  highly  ambiguous,  since  on  the 
one  hand  it  might  offer  protection  and  on  the  other  counsel 
restraint.  Equally  unclear  is  its political position on  the 
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was  decided at  the  end  of  the  Second  World  War,  there  was  sai,ie 
talk  of  partial  annexation  by  the  Sudan).  The  Sudan  is  more 
deeply  involved  than  other  countr;es  vf  the  region  with  the  flow 
of  refugees,  who  are  confronting  it with  immense  economic  and 
political  problems:  by  their  very  nature,  the  camps  are  a 
potential  source  of  subversion.  The  agreements  with  Ethiopia, 
whose  apparent  purpose  is  to prevent  the  infiltration into 
Ethiopia  of  a~med forces  from  the  Sudan  ~nd to  stem  th~ flow  of 
refugees  in  the  opposite  direction~ have  ih  practice  been 
inoperative.  In  this  connection,  attention  should  be  drawn  to 
the  increased  tensions  between  the  Sudan  and  Ethiopia,  which  the 
Sudan  accuses  of  supporting  the  rebellious movements  of  the 
south. 
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For  many  years  Kenya  has  been  one  of  the  economically  most  pro-
gressive  and  politically most  stable  countries  of  black  Africa. 
Today,  however,  it is  encountering  serious difficulties  in  its 
efforts to  initiate a  process  of  rapid  industrialization. 
Because  of  its systematic  involvement  in  world  trade,  Kenya  has 
suffered more  than  other  African  countries  from  the  effects of 
the  international  recession.  The  deterioration of  the  terms  of 
trade  has  resulted  in  an  expanding  balance-of-payments deficit 
and  hence  in  a  constant  shortage  of  foreign  currency  since 
proceeds  from  exports  of  agricultural  products  - still the 
country's  only  major  resource- have  fallen  sharply,  while  the 
value  of  imports,  public  expenditure  and  hence  the  internal  and 
external  debt  continue  to  rise.  These  factors  have  in  turn 
fuelled  inflation and  increased  the  rate  of  unemployment,  a 
problem  further  accentuated  by  the  process  of  urbanization. 
The  partial  redistribution  of  the  'white  Lands'  has  failed  to 
solve  the  Kenyan  farmers'  problem  of  a  shortage  of  fertile  land. 
The  Minister  of  Finance,  Arthur  Magugu,, painted  a  gloomy  picture 
of  the  economic  situation when  he  presented  the  budget  for 
1983-84.  Since  1978,  when  the  crisis began,  the  terms  of  trade 
have  deteriorated  by  30%.  In  1982,  exports  fell  by  75%.  In 
the  same  year,  the  current  accounts  deficit  amounted  to  427 
million dollars.  This  was  an  improvement  on  1980,  when  the  need 
to  make  additional  purchases  of  foodstuffs  forced  the  deficit  up 
to  503  million dollars.  Nonetheless,  this  improvement  was 
achieved  only  by  curbing  imports,  which  has  had  a  negative  impact 
on  Living  standards  and  investment  projects.  In  its  new  budget, 
the  government  has  reduced  import  Levies.  In  the  short  term, 
this  is  Likely  to  increase  the  volume  of  imports  and  hence 
further  increase  the deficit. 
The  government  is nevertheless  trying  to  stimulate  investment 
(while  maintaining  a  mixed  economy)  and  to  meet  the  targets  sugges-
ted  by  the  International  Monetary  Fund.  But,  as  the  Finance  Minister 
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There  is  a  danger  that  this will  create  social  tensions  and  that 
these  will  be  intensified by  tribal  tensions. 
b  - eQli!i£~1-~i!~~!iQo 
The  political stability of  Kenya  was  severely  tested by  the abor-
tive  coup  d'etat  of  August  1982.  This  revolt,  which  was  planned 
by  the air  force,  was  put  down  by  the  army.  However,  although  the 
political and  institutional  structures  have  remained  formally 
untouched,  significant  changes  have  in  fact  occurred.  The  armed 
forces  have  become  essential  to the  country's  internal  equilibrium, 
thus  diminishing  the  margin  for  manoeuvre  of  the  civilian authorit-
ies.  Furthermore,  the  fear  of  a  fresh  coup  d'etat  has  Led  the 
government  and  President  Daniel  Arap  Moi,  on  whom  the  Constitution 
bestows  very  extensive powers,  to  intensify  a  number  of  restrictive 
measures. 
Presidential  and  parliamentary  elections  were  held  in  August  and 
September  1983.  These  had  the  unfortunate effect  of  reviving  the 
climate  of  fear  and  nervousness  that  had  been  created by  the 
attempted  coup  d'etat.  Tensions  w~re further  heightened  by  the 
arrest  of  many  opposition  Leaders,  by  the  violent  confrontations 
which  marked  the  election  campaign  and  by·  the  sacking of  the 
powerful  Minister  for  Constitutional Affairs,  Charles  Njonjo. 
The  re-election of  Arap  Moi  and  the  election of  representatives 
to  the  new  Parliament, all of  whom  are  members  of  the  single,  Kanu, 
party,  have  done  nothing  so  far  to remove  the threat to internal stability. 
Kenya  has  always  belonged  to  the  moderate,  pro-Western movement. 
Its  importance  as  a  regional  ally of  the  Western  powers  in  the 
Horn  of  Africa  and,  above  all, vis-a-vis  the  Indian  Ocean  has 
steadily  increased.  The  most  important  development  for  this 
alliance  was  the  decision  to  allow  the  United  States  armed  forces 
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been  a  substantial  flow  of  arms  from  the  US  to Kenya1  This 
has  helped  to  improve  Kenya's  relations  with  Somalia,  which 
is  also prepared  to  defend  Western  interests  in  the  area. 
Nairobi  is  nevertheless mistrustful  of  Somalia  and,  at  the 
end  of  the  1970s,  came  close  to  breaking off  relations.  The 
reason  for  this  is that  the  Mogadishu  government  has  never,  on 
principle,  abandoned  its attempts  to  renegotiate  the  frontiers 
established  in  the  colonial  era,  since its aim  has  always  been 
the  reunification of  all  the  Somali  peoples.  A small  Somali 
population  is  to  be  found  in  the  northern  region  of  Kenya. 
Somali  irredentism  has  created  a  few  problems  for  the  central 
authorities  by  fomenting  further  ethnic  and  tribal discord. 
It  has  also prompted  Nairobi  to  show  some  support  for  Ethiopia, 
its ally against  'Pan-Somalism',  even  though  they  stand 
opposed  in  terms  of  their  choice  of  social  systems  and  inter-
national allies. 
It  witl  be  appreciated,  therefore,  that  an  equitable  settlement 
of  the  conflicts  in  the  Horn  of  Africa  would  help  to  'clear the 
air'  as  far  as  the  policies  pursued  by  Kenya  are  concerned. 
Kenya  is  the  second  largest  beneficiary  in  Africa  of  United 
States  economic  and  military aid  ($  112  million). 
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i  The  European  Parliament's  resolution on  human  rights  in  the  world  un-
reservedly  condemns  'the violations  to  a  great~r c;- Lesser  degree  of  basic 
human  rights  and  fundamental  f~cedoms  in  many  ACP  countries,  in  certain of 
which  these  violations  could  be  considered  to  be  gross  and  systematic,  most 
2  notably  in  Ethiopia,  Guinea  and  Uganda' 
In  its  Latest  report  <1983),  Amnesty  International  states that  it is 
particularly disturbed  by  the  number  of  cases  of  detention  without  trial, 
the  number  of  arrests  for  political  reasons,  the  fact  that  the  government 
has  still not  provided  information  on  various  prisoners  who  'disappeared' 
in  1979,  the  alleged  torture of  prisoners  and  the  harshness  of  prison  con-
ditions. 
The  situation  seems  to  be  Less  serious  in  Somalia  than  in  Ethiopia.  In 
its 1983  report,  Amnesty  International  expresses  concern  about  the 
detention without  trial  of  opponents  of  the  government,  the  harshness  of 
prison  conditions  and  brutal  methods  of  execution. 
The  United  States State  Department  publication  'Country  Reports  on  Human 
Right  Practices  for  1982'  points  out  that  fundamental  freedoms  are still 
restricted,  that  in  cases  involving  national  security  the  government  holds 
suspects  in  prison  without  bringing  charges  notwithstanding  the  provisions 
of  the  Constitution,  and  that  political dissidents  are  not  always  tried  in 
public. 
According  to  the  publication  'Country  Reports  on  Human  Right  Practices  for 
1982',  Djibouti  probably  complies  with  the  internationally accepted  human 
rights  code  applied  to  single-party states. 
In  its  1983  report,  Amnesty  International  states  that  it was  informed  that 
88  Ethiopian  refugees,  mostly  students,  were  arrested  and  handed  over  to 
the  Ethiopian  authorities.  The  Djibouti  government  notified  Amnesty  that  the 
individuals  concerned  had  illegally entered  the  State  and  been  involved  in 
robbery  and  armed  attacks.  Requests  for  further  details  by  Amnesty  Inter-
national  have  met  with  no  response. 
2  OJ  C  161  of  20.6.1983,  pp.  58  to  66 
Idem,  section  (V),  para.  (a)  - 41  -VII  - TH~  PROBLEM  OF  REFUGEES  IN  THE  HORN  OF  AFRICA  AND  IN  THE  SUDAN 
As  a  cvnsequence  of  the  Somalia-Ethiopia  and  the  Ethiopia-Eritrea conflicts, 
the  refugee  problem  in  the  Horn  of  Africa  and  in  neighbouring  Sudan  has 
dS~umed alarming  proportions.  In  this  chapter,  we  shall  briefly  review  the 
situation,  taking each  country  in  turn. 
There  are  about  11,nnn  refugees  in  Ethiopia  and  they  have  Lived  there  for 
10  to  12  years.  They  are  Somalis  and  come  from  the  rural  population  of 
L 
.  1  Sarna  1a  • 
In  1980, onemillion  Somalis  from  Ogaden,  Oromo,  Bale  and  Sidomo  took  refuge 
in  SomaLi a.  However,  this  number  has  now  somewhat  diminished. 
According  to  the  Office  of  the  High  Commissioner  for  Refugees,  they  settled 
in  the  first  half  of  1981  and  were  joined  by  a  further  massive  inflow  of 
tefugees  in  1982  and  at  the  beginning  of  1983. 
Most  of  the  refugees  are  women  and  children,  Living  in  35  refugee  camps. 
ln  March  1983,  the  High  Commissioner  for  Refugees  visited  Somalia  to  carry 
,,ut  a  sur·vey  of  the  needs  of  the  refugees  and  of  the  settlement  and  re-
accommodation  problems. 
uuring  this visit,  the  Somali  government  announced  that  priority would  be. 
yiven  to  the  repatriation  of  those  wishing  to  return  home  and  that  a  settle-
ment  programme  would  be  introduced  to  help  those  who  remained  dependent  on 
the  support  of  others. 
fhe  Somali  government  also  indicated  that  it  would  Look  favourably  on  a 
tripartite agreement  such  as  that  reached  between  Djibouti,  Ethiopia  and 
the  Utfice  of  the  High  Commissioner  for  Refugees  i~ as  in  the  case  of 
Djibouti,  the  European  Community  provided  aid2• 
2 
Assessment  contained  in  the  'Report  on  the  aid  activities  of  the  HCR  in 
1982-1983  and  draft  programmes  budget  for  1984  financed  by  the  Funds  created 
from  voluntary  contributions',  published  by  the  Office  of  the  Uniterl  Nations 
High  Lc•mmissioner  for  Refugees  (8  August  1983). 
Pres1dent  MenghisttJ  himself  is  Likely  to  agr·et•  on  this  procedure  ii  it  is 
pr·upu~;t'd  bv  tht'  ft11·opean  Community.  This  was  .v;cerrained  by  the  European 
f'·71j'.L"1.Jin-)'l  ·.:-1:,,  1·~~:r·  11_•!  L-·  1\1,·  Poniilt(l\.1~-1~.-~ The  number  of  refugees  in  Djibouti,  almost  all  of  whom  are  Ethiopians,  was 
estimated  at  35,000  in  19821.  Most  are  women  and  children  under  15  years 
of  age.  The  refugees  arrived  in  1977-78  in  the  aftermath  of  the  Ogaden  war. 
They  make  up  slightly  Less  than  10%  of  thP  ~~:a~ population. 
A tripartite  commission,  consisting of  representatives  of  the  Djibouti  and 
Ethiopian  governments  and  the  High  Commissioner  for  Refugees,  met  in  1983 
and  reached  an  agreement  aimed  at  repatriation. 
The  European  Community  has  provided  aid  to  help  implement  the  resettlement 
programme. 
Repatriation  began  in  September  1983.  Unfortunately,  however,  there  is  evidence 
of  some  forcible  repatriation. 
2  At  the  end  of  1982,  the  Sudan  took  in 460,000  Ethiopian  and  Eritrean  refugees 
The  High  Commissioner  has  recently  been  informed  of  the  arrival  in  eastern 
Sudan  of  about  13,000  refugees  from  Ethiopia.  This  migration  is partly ex-
plained  by  the  drought  in  the  regions  of  origin3. 
The  Sudanese  government's  policy  is  to  continue  to  take  in  refugees  in  areas 
of  organized  settlement  and  to  encourage  them  to  achieve  self-sufficiency 
through  agriculture. 
Source:  Office  of  the  United  Nations  High  Commissioner  for  Refugees, 
op.  cit. 
2  Estimate  of  the  Office  of  the  High  Commissioner,  op.  cit.;  the  Sudan 
has  also  accepted  170,000  refugees  from  Uganda,  2,000  from  Chad  and· 
5,000  from  Zaire. 
3  Office  of  the  High  Commissioner,  op.  cit. 
- ~ - PE  87.298/fin. VIII  - THE  POSITION  OF  THE  EUROPEAN  PARLIAMENT  AND  A COMMUNITY  STRATEGY 
Before  direct  elections,  the  European  Parliament  adopted  a  resolution  on  res-
pect  for  human  rights  in  Ethiopia1  Since direct elections,  it  has  adopted 
as  many  as  five  resolutions  on  the  Horn  of  Africa,  which  bear  witness  to  the 
interest  evinced  in  the  problems  of  the  region. 
2  The  first  resolution  was  adopted  on  14  December  1979  ,  the  second  on 
23  May  19803,  the  third  in  July  19804,  the  fourth  on  18  November  19825 
and  the  fifth  and  Last  on  14  April  19836• 
The  first  resolution  concerns'the tragic  plight  of  refugees,  particularly 
children,  in  the  Horn  of  Africa'  and  the  appalling  conditions  in  which  they 
Live  in  the  refugee  camps.  The  European  Parliament  called on  the  Member  States 
to take  prompt  and  special  action  with  a  view  to elaborating  a  programme  of 
economic  aid.  It  reaffirmed  the  need  to  convene  an  international  conference, 
under  the  aegis  of  the  United  Nations  and  the  OAU  and  with  the  direct  par-
ticipation of  the  countries  of  the  Horn  of  Africa,  with  the  aim  of  establishing 
a  regional  cooperation policy.  The  principal  objectives  of  the  programme 
would  be  to facilitate  peaceful  solutions,  promote  the  integration or 
voluntary  repatriation  of  refugees  and  improve  the  transport  facilities 
needed  for  the  despatch  and  distribution  of  economic  aid.  Parliament  con-
demned  the  superpower  policy  of  sending  excessive  supplies  of  arms  to  the 
area  at  the  expense  of  humanitarian  aid  and  the  social  and  economic  develop-
ment  of  the  peoples  concerned. 
The  second  resolution,  on  23  May  1980,  concerns  the  terrible  conditions  in 
the  refugee  camps  in  Somalia.  Parliament  addressed  an  urgent  appeal  to  the 
Council  and  Commission  to  ensure  that  Community  food  aid  was  provided 
immediately  so  as  to  avert  a  further  worsening  of  the  situation. 
The  third  resolution,  of  July  1980,  called  for  an  increase  in  Community 
food  aid  to  meet  the  increasing  needs  of  the  region.  Such  aid  had  become 
all  the  more  urgent  because  of  the  crisis affecting  Somalia. 
OJ  C 140/82  of  5.6.1979 
2  OJ  C 4/75  of  7.1.1980 
3  OJ  C 147/120  of  16.6.1980 
4  OJ  C 197/81  of  4.8.1980 
5  OJ  C 334/84  of  20.12.1982 
6  OJ  C 128/63  of  1  6.5.1983 
- 4/.t  - PE  87 .298/fin. The  fourth  resolution,  of  18  November  1982,  focuses  on  the  situation  in 
Somalia.  Parliament  condemned  the  continuing  aggressive  incursions  of  the 
Ethiopian  army  into  Somalia  and  argued  that  the  European  Community  should 
decide  not  to  commit  further  aid  to  Ethiopia  until  a  report  on  the  matter 
had  been  made  by  the  Commission  to  Parliament. 
In  the fifth  resolution,  of  14  April  1983,  Parliament  requested  that 
emergency  aid  to  Ethiopia  should  be  channeLLed  through  the  NGOs  and  suitable 
international  agencies  in  order  to  ensure  that  the  real  objectives  of  the 
Community's  aid  programme  were  met,  bearing  in  mind  that  the  present  in-
stability of  the  region  might  otherwise  cause  the  aid to be  used  for  the 
11rong  purposes. 
These  resoLutions  called attention to the  fact  that  the  Commission  should 
provide  not  just  food  aid,  but  also  and  above  all  humanitarian aid  and  support 
for  the  thousands  of  people  in  refugee  camps.  Moreover,  the  aid  should  be 
destined  in particular  for  the  children  Living  in  these  camps. 
In  July  1981,  a  European  Parliament  delegation visited Ethiopia  and  reported 
that  the  country  had  made  responsible  and  effective. use  of  the  food  and 
other  aid  provided  by  the  Community.  It felt  that  this  should  encourage  the 
Community  to  continue  to  pursue  a  policy  aimed  at  the  economic  development 
and  social  advancement  of  the  region. 
In  June  1983,  a  European  Parliament  delegation  Led  by  Mr  Poniatowski, 
chairman  of  the  Committee  on  Development  and  Cooperation,  visited  Ethiopia, 
Djibouti  and  Somalia  in  order  to assess  the  conditions  under  which  Community 
food  aid  was  distributed.  The  delegation  found  that  it is  being distributed 
properly but  that  difficulties still arise after the  goods  have  been  put 
ashore.  The  facilities  available  for  transporting the  aid  from  the  ports 
to  the  villages  and  refugee  camps  for  which  it  is  intended  are  unsatisfactory. 
The  goods  arrive  extremely  Late  and  when  they  do  arrive  they  are  usually  in 
a  bad  condition.  The  delegation  inspected  the  refugee  camps  and  concluded 
that  they  were  satisfactory  both  in  terms  of  food  supplies  and  in  terms  of 
health  and  hygiene  facilities.  However,  the  'quasi-permanent'  state of 
these  camps  is  unacceptable,  since  there  is  a  danger  of  creating  a  Palestinian-
type  situation,  which  would  pose  a  threat  to  the  internal  stability of 
Somalia  and  Ethiopia. 
- 45  - PE  87.298/fin. We  can,  however,  take  heart  from  the  fact  that  the  flow  of  refugees  has  been 
arrested  and  even  reversed,  since  groups  of  refugees  are  already  returning 
to  Ethiopia. 
Today,  there  can  be  no  objection  to  the  Community  opening  negotiations  with 
the  countries  of  the  Horn  of  Africa,  since  the  tensions  in  the  region  are 
gradually  subsiding.  The  Community  should  pursue  a  policy  of  economic 
cooperation  which  would  enable  the  region  to work  its way  out  of  the  present 
difficult  stage  in  its history.  The  first priority,  however,  must  be  to 
alleviate  the  suffering of  the  children  in  the  refugee  camps. 
- ~ - PE  87.298/fin. CONCLUSIONS 
As  has  been  shown  in  the  foregoing  pages,  the  problems  of  the  Horn  of 
Africa  will  be  extremely  difficult  to  solve.  Yet,  despite  their ex:eptional 
complexity,  the  European  Community  cannot  remain  indifferent  to  them. 
While  for  the  Ten  there  are  strategic  intP~::~s dt  stake, it cannot  be 
forgotten  that  the  countries  oi  the  region- Ethiopia,  Somalia  and  Djibouti, 
but .also  the  Sudan  and  Kenya  - are  signatories  to  the  Convention  of  Lome 
and  as  such  closely  associated  with  the  Community. 
The  Ten  must  firmly  condemn  the  countless  interventions  of  the  Eastern  bloc 
countries,  which  have  triggered  in  the  region  a  process  of  major  power 
confrontation  and  rearmament. 
The  Ten  should  bring  pressure  to bear  on  the  Soviet  Union  in  the  hope  of 
persuading  it  to  withdraw  its own  troops  and  those  of  its allies  and  to  help 
the  international  community  resolve  the  tragic  and  destabilizing  refugee 
problem. 
By  virtue of  their  former  colonial  interests,  some  of  the  Community  Member 
States still maintain more  or  less  close  relations  with  the  countries  of 
the  Horn  of  Africa.  Yet  a  common  position  allowing  a  concerted  response 
and  concerted  action  on  the  part  of  the  Ten  would  still  seem  to  be  lacking. 
Consequently,  the  first  step  should  be  to  introduce  a  common  programme  of 
action  to  promote  a  settlement  of  the  prevailing  conflicts, particularly 
that  between  Ethiopia  and  Eritrea.  Since,  however,  the  situation  is  so 
complex  and  so  delicate,  it  is plain  that  the  Community  must  proceed  with 
extreme  caution  and  pursue  a  policy  of  mediation  based  on  the  accepted  rules 
of  diplomacy. 
The  Ten  should  also exert  discreet  but  firm  pressure  on  the  governments  of 
the  region  with  a  view  to  securing  respect  for  human  rights,  both  generally 
and  in  specific  cases  and  situations.  Special  efforts  should  be  made  to 
protect  human  rights  in  Ethiopia,  since  it  is  in  that  country  that  the 
gravest  violations  seem  to  have  occurred.  One  of  the  most  distressing 
problems  of  the  region,  in  both  moral  and  human  terms,  is that  of  the 
refugee  camps  which,  by  their  very  nature,  also  pose  a  threat  to  stability; 
indeed,  the  existence  of  these  camps  could  well  create  a  Palestinian-type 
situation,  which  would  have  perilous  consequence  both  for  the  host  countries 
and  for  the  region  as  a  whole. 
PE  87 .298/·fin. Consequently,  while  the  Community  should  do  all  within  its power  to 
alleviate  the  plight  of  the  refugees  with  food  and  financial  aid,  it should 
also  seek  to  encourage  their  repatriation. 
-- ilj  -··  PE  87.298/fin. OPINION  OF  THE  COMMITTEE  ON  DEVE:..0i-'i•IENT  ANDCIDERATION 
Draftsman:  Mr  M.  PONIATOWSKI 
On  29  September  1983,  the  Committee  on  Development  and  Cooperation  appointed 
Mr  Michel  PONIATOWSKI  draftsman ot  the  opinion. 
The  committee  considered  the  draft  opinion at  its meeting  of  26  January  1984. 
It  adopted  its findings  unanimously  on  2  February  1984. 
The  folowing  took  part  in  the  vote:  Mr  BERSANI  (vice-chairman,  acting 
chairman),  Mr  DENIS  (vice-chairman),  Mr  COHEN,  Mr  DESCHAMPS  <deputizing  for 
Mr  NADUCCU,  Mrs  DURY,  Mr  ENRIGHT,  Mr  FERRERO,  Mr  HOWELL  (deputizing  for 
Mr  de  COURCY  LING,  Mr  IRMER,  Mr  JACKSON,  Mr  LEZZI,  Mr  LOO,  Mr  J.D.  TAYLOR 
(deputizing  for  Mr  SHERLOCK),  Mr  VANKERKHOVEN,  Mr  VERGEER  and  Mr  WEDEKIND. 
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The  Committee  on  Development  and  Cooperation  requests  the  Political 
Affairs  Committee  to  take  into  account  the  following  points  and  also  the 
explanatory  statement: 
stresses that  Community  aid,  and  more  particularly  food  aid  and  emergency 
relief,  have  greatly  contributed  to  the  chances  ot  survival  ot  the  peoples 
in this  region,  who  are  victims  simultaneously  at  both  drought  and 
political  conflict; 
points  out  that  the  European  Parliament  delegation  which  visited this 
region  in  June  1983  found  that  aid,  and  particularly  food  aid,  was 
apparently  being  put  to  proper  use  in  Ethiopia,  Djibouti  and  Somalia; 
stresses  the  need  tor  the  Community  to  continue  and,  indeed  step  up,  its 
cooperation  on  development  in  these  countries,  thus  helping  to stabilize 
this  region; 
also  stresses  the  importance  of  ensuring  that  emergency  aid  reaches  those 
in  need,  irrespective  of  the political  situation; 
considers  that  the  Tripartite  Agreement  concluded  between  Ethiopia, 
Djibouti  and  the  HCR  on  the  voluntary  repatridtion of  refugees  represPnt; 
a  good  solution,  provided: 
that  repatriation  is  on  a  genuinely  voluntary  basis,  duly  verifiable 
by  independent  observers, 
•  that  Ethiopia  guarantees  the  safety  of  those  repatriated, 
that  the  international  community,  including  the  European  Community, 
contributes  to  the  financing  of  the  repatriation  and  resettlement 
operation; 
considers  that  an  agreement  between  Ethiopia,  Somalia  and  the  HCR,  based 
on  the  same  principles,  would  be  desirable  and  that  an  agreement  of  this 
sort  would  represent  a  first  step  towards  normalization  of  relations 
between  Ethiopia  and  Somalia; 
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INTRODUCTION 
Having  regard  to  s~veral motions  for  resolutions  Ctabled  pursuant  to Rule 
47  of  the  RUles  ot  Procedure)  on  the  •s•:uaclon  in Eritrea'  or  'the  forced 
repatriation of  refugees  in ojibouti'  and  'granting  emergency  food  aid to 
Ethiopia',  the  Political Affairs  Committee  decided  to  draw  up  a  report  on  the 
situution  in  the  Horn  ot  Africa. 
Owing  to its very  general  nature,  such  a  title comprises  an  inherent 
risk.  The  complexity  of  the  situation  in  this  region  of  Africa,  the 
interplay  between  the  problems,  the  very  different  levels  at  which  these 
problems  are  pitched,  may  well  Lead  the  European  Parliament  astray  when 
adopting  its position. 
Before  demarcating  the  scope  of  our  opinion,  this being  a  function  of  the 
terms  of  reference  of  our  committee,  it is  u~eful to  recall  the  limits  within 
which  the  European  Parliament  has  to  work.  These  are  primarily  dictated  by 
the  principle of  non-interference. 
For  conclusions  reached  when  examining  how  Community  aid  is  used,  how  the 
needs  of  the  countries  in this  region  are  developing  - through  natural 
disasters or  the  works  of  man  - and  when  analysing  the  refugee  situation, 
ought  not  to  Lead: 
to  pronouncements  on  the political  systems  in  the  countries  of  this  region, 
to  pronouncements  on  the  system  of  alliances  and  agreements  entered  into 
by  these  countries, 
to pronouncements  for  or  against  the  various  more  or  less  overt  a~ts oi 
rebellion or guerilla  warfare  which  may  be  taking  place  in  these  countries. 
lite  principle  ot  non-interference prohibits  the  Community  from  adopting 
such  positions.  Moreover  the  situation  in  the  Horn  of  Africa  is at  present 
so  confused  that  the  Community  would  have  everything  to  lose  by  seeking  to  set 
itself  up  as  an  arbiter. 
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Committee  will  be  confined: 
to  the  aid  which  the  Community  gives  or  should give  to  the  countries  in 
the  Horn  of  Africa,  taking  into  account  their  specific difficulties; 
to the  problems  of  refugees. 
A delegation  from  our  committee1  visited  Ethiopia,  Djibouti  and  Somalia 
from  19  to  29  June  1983.  On  the  basis  of  their visits to  these  countries  and 
their talks  with  political  Leaders,  they  were  able  to  form  an  opinion  on  the 
two  above  aspects.  In  addition  they  were  also able  to  take  stock  of 
developments  in  the  situation  in  Eritrea  and  more  particularly  in  the  regions 
of  Asmara  and  Massawa. 
I.  STATES  PARTICIPATING  IN  THE  COOPERATION  BETWEEN  THE  COUNTRIES  OF  THE  HORN 
OF  AFRICA  AND  THE  EEC 
(a)  Ethiopia 
With  33.5  million  inhabitants  <and  a  surface  area of  1,221,900  km2> 
Ethiopia is, after Nigeria,  the  most  populous  country_ in  Africa  below  the 
Sahel. 
With  a  gross  national  product  estimated  at  140  dollars  per  head  <1981 
figure>,  it is one  of  the  poorest  countries  of  Africa.  These  simple  facts 
explain  straightaway  why  this  country  is ·the  major  beneficiary  of  financial 
and  technical  aid  from  the  European  Community  under  the  Convention  of  lome 
<indicative programme  for  the  Fifth  EDF:  from  125  to  144  million  ECU). 
Ethiopia  is also  one  of  the  major  beneficiaries of  food  aid  from  the 
Community. 
This  amounted  in  1983  to:  23,000  tonnes  of  cereals;  3,700  tonnes  of  milk 
powder  and  625  tonnes  of  butteroil. 
led  by  Mr  PONIATOwSKI  and  comprising  Mr  BERSANI,  Mr  KUHN,  Mr  PEARCE, 
Mr  FERRERO  and  Mr  de  La  MAlENE 
- 52  - PE  87.298 /fin. This  aid  is  further  supplemented  by  emergency  aid,  which  in  1983  amounted 
t (): 
- 23,500  tonnes  ot  cereals, 
- 2,200  tonnes  of milk  powder, 
- 600  tonnes  of  butteroil, 
- 250,000  ECU  for  the  pur·chase  of  beans  and 
- 2  million  ECU  for  drought  victims. 
Apart  from  Community  aid,  which,  depending  on  the  year,  represents  either 
a  third or  a  half  of  all  aid  received,  Ethiopia  also  receives  a  good  deal  of 
bilateral  aid,  either  from  Member  States  or  from  Western  countries  such  as 
Canada  and  Australia. 
- On  the  use  of  aid 
Through  its various  visits  in  the  area  (to  Asosa,  Ebnet,  Asmara  and 
Massawa)  its meetings  with  Ethiopian  leaders,  its discussions  with  members  of 
the  HCR  and  various  non-governmental  organizations,  the  delegation  from  the 
European  Parliament  was  able  to  satisfy  itself that  food  aid  had  been  properly 
used  and,  contrary  to  certain allegations,  had  not  been  diverted  from  its 
goal.  This  is also  confirmed  by  a  report  drawn  up  by  the  services  of  the 
Commission  of  the  Communities  (PE  85.415).  In  its press  release  issued 
following  the  visit, the  European  Parliament  delegation declared: 
that  the  statements  by  the  Ethiopi~n authorities on  the  receipt, 
accounting,  channelling  and  distribution of  aid  were  confirmed  by  the 
representatives ot  the  international  authorities operating  in  the  area, 
and  by  the  agents  of  non-governmental  organizations, 
that,  following  unloading  and  an  initial period  of  storage  at  the  port  of 
Assaua,  food  aid  was  transported  by  convoy  to  the  various disaster-
stricken  regions.  Thus  a  part  of  this  aid  was  channelled  to  Asmara,  from 
whose  storage  centre  it  was  shared  among  the  various distribution  centres. 
Reference  should  also  be  made  to  a  difficulty  connected  with  the 
distribution of  food  aid  which,  though  not  specifically  confined  to  Ethiopia, 
is particularly worrying  in  this  country  because  of  its  size  and  geography: 
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interior of  the  country.  The  international  community  of  donors,  and  in 
particular the  European  Community,  should  in  future  pay  greater  heed  to  this 
aspect  as  it  is  vital  to  the  effectiveness  ot  their  food  aid. 
(b)  Djibouti 
Independent  since  June  1977,  the  Republic  of  Djibouti  (21,783  km2)  has 
an  estimated  population  of  350,000  inhabitants  (per  capita  GNP  480  dollars). 
Apart  from  its geographical  and  climatic  situation,  it  is noted  tor  one  ot  the 
highest  population  growth  rates  in  the  world  (49  per  thousand).  More  than 
half  of  the  inhabitants  of  the  country  are  under  20  years  of  age.  The 
delegation  was  able  to take  stock  of  the  serious  consequences  of  the 
drought.  Between  1978  and  1980  one-third  of  the  nomad  population  were  the 
victims  of  drought;  40%  of  their  livestock  was  lost.  During  this  period  the 
Djibouti  authorities  set  up  some  20  camps  to  accommodate  and  help  those 
affected.  Thanks  to  international  aid,  including  that  from  the  Community, 
those  living  in  the  camps  were  fed  tor  one  year.  The  camps  were  subsequently 
phased  out  and  now  contain  only  6,000  people  (divided  between  2  camps). 
'Food  tor  work'  programmes  were  recently  instituted but,  according  to  those  in 
charge,  increased  aid  is  required  it  they  are  to  continue. 
Under  the  Fifth  EDF,  Djibouti  should  receive  aid  amounting  to  between  4.8 
and  5.4 million  ECU.  In  addition there  is  annual  food  aid  consisting  of: 
4,000  tonnes  of  cereal,  200  tonnes  of  milk  and  100  tonnes  of  butteroi l. 
Finally,  like  the  other  countries  in  the  Horn  of  Africa,  Djibouti  has 
regularly  received  emergency  aid  to  help  it  cope  with  natural  disasters. 
While  Community  aid  is  very  much  appreciated,  the  authorities  in  Djibouti 
have  voiced  a  certain  number  of  criticisms.  The  most  tundament~L criticism 
concerns  the  Community's  failure  to  take  into  account,  in  calculating  the 
amount  from  the  Fifth  EDF  allocated  to  Djibouti,  the  special  geographical 
situation of  the  country  and  the  consequences  of  its  late  accession  to 
independence.  The  Minister  tor  Foreign  Affairs  talked  at  great  length  on  the 
subject  of  Djibouti's  economic  dependence  on  Ethiopia  and  Somalia,  which  is 
due  to  its position.  However,  the  latter  country  is  in  a  very  difficult 
economic  situation and  economic  revival  is  very  slow  in  coming  to  Ethiopia. 
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it  only  became  independent  6  years  ago,  the  Community  has  not  given  this 
country  aid  in  proportion  to  that  given  to  the  other  ACP  countries. 
(c)  Somalia 
With  a  surface  area  of  637r~57  km2,  Somalia  has  only  3.8  m~llion 
inhabitant~.  Its  GNP  is estimated to  be  slightly  higher  than  Ethiopia's  C140 
dollars).  However  70Z  ot  the  population  reaches  a  Level  of  subsistence 
equivalent  to  200- 250  dollars  for  a  family  of  5  people. 
According  to  the  indicative  programmes  for  the  Fifth  EDF,  Somalia  should, 
under  the  Convention  of  Lome  II,  receive  Community  aid  worth  between  73  and  83 
million  ECU.  There  is  in addition  food  aid  and  emergency  aid  from  the 
Community,  which  in  1983  was  broken  down  as  follows: 
- Food  aid:  23,000  tonnes  of  cereals 
3,700  tonnes  ot  milk  powder 
625  tonnes  of  butteroil 
- Emergency  aid:  15,100  tonnes  of  cereal 
1,280 tonnes  of  sugar 
900  tonnes  of  colza  oil 
1,000  tonnes  of  milk  powder 
3,000  tonnes  of  beans 
700  tonnes  of  butteroil  and 
500,000  ECU  for  the  purchase  of  beans. 
ALL  the  ministers  to whom  the  delegation  talked stressed the  inadequacy  of 
the  Community  aid  allocated  to  Somalia,  the  excessive  delay  in the  delivery  of 
food  aid  (there  was  the  case  of  a  vessel  which  unloaded  its food  aid  supplies 
only  after  it  had  been  at  sea  tor  9  months),  the  delays  in the appraisal  and 
carrying  out  of  projects  and,  finally,  the  absolute  necessity  for  the 
development,  in  particular  through  the  next  Convention,  of  Somalia's  fish 
resources  (more  than  3,000  kilometres  of  coastline). 
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There  are  currently  about  735,000  Ethiopian  refugees,  o1  whom  35,000  are 
in  Djibouti  and  700,000  in  Somalia. 
The  delegation  visited  the  camps  at  Ali-Sabieh  (Djibouti),  Saba'ad  d'Arri 
Addeyse  and  Yalalaqusi  (Somalia).  On  the  whole  it  found  that  the  food  and 
sanitary  situation  were  satisfactory  (tuberculosis  was  the  most  common 
disease).  The  satisfactory  state of  affairs  was  due  to  international  aid, 
including  that  from  the  Community,  and  the  devoted  efforts  of  volunteers  from 
non-governmental  organizations,  all  under  the  efficient  control  ot  the  HCR. 
The  HCR  authorities  in  Somalia  had,  however,  noted  a  marked  deterioration  in 
the  food  situation  in  the  camp  in  1983,  when  food  aid  was  granted  tor  a 
population  of  only  500,000  refugees  whereas  700,000  rations  had  to  be  found. 
The  delegation  also  realized  that  the  continuation  of  a  situation  in  which 
refugees  were  more  or  Less  permanent  would  give  rise  to  serious 
difficulties.  For  human,  social  and  political considerations,  their  status 
as  inactive,  assisted  persons  cannot  be  allowed  to persist  for  too  Long. 
There  is, moreover,  the  possibility of  a  'Palestinian'  situation developing  in 
this  region,  w~ich represents  a  danger  both  for  Somalia  and  for  Ethiopia. 
Finally,  despite  international  aid,  refugees  represent  an  unacceptable  burden 
on  Djibouti  or  Somalia  in  the  Long-term. 
Aware  of  these  risks,  the  delegation discussed  with  the  three  heads  of 
state  a  basis  for  a  possible  agreement  on  the  resettlement  of  refugees.  It 
emerged  during  the  course  of  these  talks  that  both  Djibouti  and  Ethiopia  were 
satisfied with  the  Tripartite  Agreement  concluded  between  these  two  countries 
and  the  HCR  concerning  the  repatriation  of  Ethiopian  refugees,  and  with  the 
aid  from  the  international  community,  including  the  European  Community,  for 
this  resettlement  operation  (cost  estimated  by  the  HCR:  8  million dollars). 
President  MENGISTU  made  it clear that  he  would  accept  a  similar  proc~dure 
<Ethiopia,  Somalia,  HCR  Agreement- repatriation on  a  voluntary  basis- aid 
from  the  international  community,  including  the  European  Community,  for  the 
implementation  of  a  resettlement  programme)  for  Ethiopian  refugees  in  Somalia, 
if  it  were  proposed  by  the  European  Community.  President  Siad  BARRE  also 
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the  European  Community  would  be  acting on  the  same  terms  as  in  the  case  of 
refugees  from  Djibouti  and  that  the  implementation of  any  such  agreement  would 
be  monitored  and  guaranteed  by  international  organizations  and 
non-governmental  organizations  respectively. 
The  two  Presidents'  standpoints  represent  ar  important  development  in the 
attitude of  Ethiopia  and  Soma'-~;;,.  According  to observers  present  in  the  Horn 
of  Africa,  this development  has  been  in evidence  for  some  time  now;  for  it 
ever  to  come  to anything,  there  is need  of  a  third party  to take  the 
initiative to  consolidate  the  will  of  the  two  countries  to  find  a  solution to 
the  refugee  problem.  According  to those  who  spoke  to the  delegation,  the 
Community  ought  to take  this initiative, particularly as,  being  politically 
neutral,  its intervention will  be  regarded  as  solely  in  the  interests  of  the 
peoples  concerned. 
In  the  view  of  your  draftsman  the  conclusion  of  an  agreement  of  this  sort 
between  Ethiopia  and  Somalia,  under  the  patronage  of  the  HCR,  could  represent 
a  first  step  towards  normalization of  relations  between  these  countries,  and 
thus  help  to stabilize this  region  of  Africa. 
Finally,  the  delegation  wishes  to point  out  the  value  of  setting  up  a 
nationalities  institute,  as  planned  by  the  Ethiopian Government,  to  study the 
assimilation of  the  various  nationalities  into the  Ethiopian  institutional 
system  and  to  make  proposals  for  the  organization of  the  state to this end. 
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tabled  bY,  Hr  ~EOINI,  Mr  BARBI,  Mr  RUMOR,  Mr  KLEPSCH, 
Mr  CROUX,  Mr  HABSBURG,  Mr  PFLIMLIN,  Mr  VERGEER, 
Mrs  CASSANMAGNAGO-CERRETTI,  Mr  BOURNIAS,  Mr  ESTGEN, 
Mr  PENDERS,  Mr  DESCHAMPS,  Mr  von  HASSEL,  Mr  ANTONlOZZI, 
Mrs  I.ENZ,  Mr  GEROKOSTOPOULOS,  Mr  Konrad  SCHON, 
~rs  GAlOTTI  de  BlASE,  Mr  KATZER,  Mr  0
1 DONNELL  and 
Mr  LANG£S 
on  behalf  of  the  EPP  Group  (Christian  Democratic  Group) 
pursuant  to Rule  47  of  the  Rules  of  Procedure 
on  the  situation  in  the  r~gion of  Eritrea 
The  European  Parliament,-
A.  disturbed by  the  continuing  conflict which  is all too often forgotten 
and  which  has  raged  through  the  Region  of  Eritrea for  almost  twenty 
years,  causing  bloodshed  and  constant  suffering for  the  people, 
B.  convinced  that  a  peaceful  solution to  the  conflict  can  be  found  by 
guaranteeing,  within  the  political  unity of  the  Ethiopian State, 
advanced  forms  of  autonomy  which  have  regard  for  the  unique  ethnic, 
historical and  cultural  identity of  the  Eritrean peoples, 
C.  whereas  one  of  the  central  principles of  the  Convention  of  Lome,  of 
which  Ethiopia  is  a  member,  is  respect  for  the peaceful  co-existence 
of  peoples,  et~nic groups  and  different  cultures, 
D.  whereas  in  th~ spirit of  solidarity which  informs  that  Convention, 
its members  should  help  each  other to solve  their problems  while 
respecting  each  other's sovereignty, 
1.  Calls  on  the  Council  of  Ministers,  within  the  framework  of  the 
Convention,  to use  its good  offices with  the  Addis  Ababa  Government 
to promote  measures  to bring  the  conflict to an  end  and,  to the 
extent  that  special  needs  underlie  that  conflict,  to  ensure 
that  the  aid  instruments  of  the  Lome  Convention  can  be  used  in  the 
implementatior  of  special  schemes; 
z.  Calls  on  the  Commission: 
(a)  to provide all  possible  information on  events  in  Eritrea and 
their development; 
(b)  to promote  through  humanitarian organizations  measures  to assist 
the  victims  of  the  prolonged  war,  thus  demonstrating  its commitment 
to solidarity  among  peoples. 
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tabled by  Mr  HAHN,  ~t~ L!Nl 
I 
and  Mr  von  ~ASSEL 
pursuant  to  Rule  47  of 
the  Rules  of  Procedure 
on  the  forcible  repatriation of 
Ethiopian  refugees  in  bj~bo~ti 
A.  conscious of  the  vulnerable position of  th~ Ethiopian  refugees  in the 
OIKHOL  and  All  SABIEH  camps  in Djibouti, 
B.  aware  that  th·e  refugees  fled  from  the  r~pes!10h pr~vai ling  in Hhiopia 
at  the  risk  of  their  lives, 
c.  aware  that  the  fledgling  ~epublic of  Djibouti  is  e~p~riencing difficulties 
in  accommodating  within  its  t~r~itory the  tens  of  thousands  of  refugees 
who  are  placing  a  severe  strain on  its economy, 
D.  regretting that  the  Djibouti  authorities  have  begun  fbtcibly  repatriating 
to  Ethiopia  certain  refugees  whbm  they  regard  as  illegal  immigrants, 
E.  wishing  to  ensure  that  the  right  of  asylum  is  respected, 
1.  Requests  the  Djibouti  authorities  not  to  forcibly  repatriate  Ethiopian 
refugees  fleeing  from  a  regime  which  threatens  their  lives, 
2.  Requests  the  Commissio~ and  UN  humanitarian organizations  such  as  the 
Office  of  the  United  Nations  High  Commissioner  for  Refugees  to  increase 
their  aid  to  Djibouti  in  order  to  improve  the  position of  the  Ethiopian 
refugees  on  its territory, 
3.  Instructs  its President  to  forward  this  resolution to  the  Commission, 
the  Council,  the  Government  of  Djibouti  and  the  UN. 
- 59  - PE  87.298/fin./Ann.II MOTION  FOR  A RESOLUTION 
tabled by  Mr  ALMIRANTE,  Mr  ROMUALDI, 
Mr  BUTTAFUOCO  and  Mr  PETRONIO 
pursuant  to  Rule  47  of 
the  Rules  of  Procedure 
on  the  situation  in  ER~TREA 
A - whereas  the  Eritrean  war  of  liberation between  the people of  Eritrea 
and  the  Ethiopian  army  has  now  lasted more  than  twenty  years, 
B - whereas,  despite  the  change  of  regime  in  Addis  Abeba,  Ethiopia  is 
continuing  to  deny  the  Eritrean people  the  right  to  self-determination, 
C - whereas  the  war  in  Eritrea  has  intensified  under  the  new  Ethiopian 
authorities,  with  the  involvement  of  10,000  Cuban  soldiers,  numerous 
East  German  military  instructors  and  a  number  of  Russian military 
advisers, 
D  - whereas  Ethiopia's  aggression,  fuelled  by  the  use  of  more  sophisticated 
arms  including  chemical  and  bacteriological  weapons,  is  increasingly 
assuming  the  appearance  and  proportions  of  a  veritable genocide, 
E - having  regard  to  the  profound  attachment  of  the  Eritrean people  to  their 
own  identity,  history  and  culture,  which  distinguishes  them  totally 
from  their  Ethiopian  neighbour, 
Calls  for  : 
1.  The  recognition  of  the  Eritrean Liberation  Front  as  the  sole 
representative of  the Eritrean people; 
2.  The  Council  of  Ministers  to  request  the  withdrawal  of  all  foreign  troops 
currently  in  Eritrea; 
3.  The  respect  of  Eritrea's territorial  integrity; 
4.  Emergency  aid  to  be  sent  to  the populations  afflicted  by  the  war; 
5.  Consideration  to  be  given  to  a  financial  aid  programme  in  favour  at  the 
Eritrean Liberal  Front,  for  the  construction  of  hospitals  and  schools 
in  the  zones  it  has  already  liberated; 
6.  Instructs  its President  to  forward  this  resolution  to  the  Commission 
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